LibreChat/api/server/services/Config/mcp.js

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const { CacheKeys, Constants } = require('librechat-data-provider');
🏗️ feat: bulkWrite isolation, pre-auth context, strict-mode fixes (#12445) * fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering, matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and updateInterfacePermissions. * fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation. * feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks, so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to native bulkWrite. Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites: - agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories) - conversation (bulkSaveConvos) - message (bulkSaveMessages) - file (batchUpdateFiles) - conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts) - aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries) systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the isolation plugin. * feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto /oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs. The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped (STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the correct login page config per tenant. The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth gateway sets the header. * feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped ADMIN/USER roles. * fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook, $lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose hooks entirely. Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active. * fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the same ID values. - agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound - convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50 already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId }) - message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165 already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId }) - preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId } compound * fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be served to all tenants. Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active. Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments). Covers all read, write, and delete sites: - ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG - PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS - getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG - app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache) - mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools) - importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG * fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys. * fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings: F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes() drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts. F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode instead of silently passing through without tenant injection. F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the public package API. F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized ops as a subtype. F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for authenticated requests. F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files. F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks). F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias. F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId. * fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them. Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1, messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion to fail (expected 22, got 18). * fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode * fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id, including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config, /api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant isolation. Fixes: - preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header - scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem() - updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID - $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match for better index utilization - Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts - Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js * test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions bulkWrite spec: - deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched - replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement - replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth) - empty ops array: verifies graceful handling preAuthTenant spec: - All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless) * feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js): - Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId, preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming. FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager): - getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant. GenerationJobManager: - tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata - createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata - SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access - Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId * fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime. * fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by our new imports across 8 files. * fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries, but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId. Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false). * test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js): - Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403 - Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed - OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts): - completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context - completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context - Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows Documentation: - JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement - Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site * fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404. Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant deployments", and "single-tenant mode". * fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature (streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status, verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users. F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning. F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers. F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared; other tenants expire via TTL. F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent ALS context. F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no ALS leakage across scope boundaries. * fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded). SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called. * fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log * fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a different instance without shared Keyv storage. Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since flow keys are unscoped. Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID. * fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId) causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin. * fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning * fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely. Now deletes both when in tenant context. * fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires tenant-level access control. F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__ sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for bypass probing attempts. F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant check after resolving the job. F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode. F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403. F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form. F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since middleware calls next() (not 4xx). Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated completeFlow warning message. * fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for __SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers. B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests — cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body, cross-tenant abort returns 403. C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user. D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata, matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation. * fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order - clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache deletes instead of sequential awaits - SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat behavior for untenanted legacy jobs - conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per AGENTS.md * fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available: - Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant) - InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites (/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback). Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible when the userId check passes. * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users. Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc — other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation. * fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys. F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header. F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern). F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers. F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context. F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints. F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context). * fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
2026-03-28 16:43:50 -04:00
const { logger, scopedCacheKey } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { getCachedTools, setCachedTools } = require('./getCachedTools');
const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
/**
* Updates MCP tools in the cache for a specific server
* @param {Object} params - Parameters for updating MCP tools
* @param {string} params.userId - User ID for user-specific caching
* @param {string} params.serverName - MCP server name
* @param {Array} params.tools - Array of tool objects from MCP server
* @returns {Promise<LCAvailableTools>}
*/
async function updateMCPServerTools({ userId, serverName, tools }) {
try {
const serverTools = {};
const mcpDelimiter = Constants.mcp_delimiter;
if (tools == null || tools.length === 0) {
logger.debug(`[MCP Cache] No tools to update for server ${serverName} (user: ${userId})`);
return serverTools;
}
for (const tool of tools) {
const name = `${tool.name}${mcpDelimiter}${serverName}`;
serverTools[name] = {
type: 'function',
['function']: {
name,
description: tool.description,
parameters: tool.inputSchema,
},
};
}
await setCachedTools(serverTools, { userId, serverName });
const cache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.TOOL_CACHE);
🏗️ feat: bulkWrite isolation, pre-auth context, strict-mode fixes (#12445) * fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering, matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and updateInterfacePermissions. * fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation. * feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks, so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to native bulkWrite. Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites: - agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories) - conversation (bulkSaveConvos) - message (bulkSaveMessages) - file (batchUpdateFiles) - conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts) - aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries) systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the isolation plugin. * feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto /oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs. The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped (STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the correct login page config per tenant. The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth gateway sets the header. * feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped ADMIN/USER roles. * fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook, $lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose hooks entirely. Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active. * fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the same ID values. - agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound - convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50 already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId }) - message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165 already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId }) - preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId } compound * fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be served to all tenants. Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active. Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments). Covers all read, write, and delete sites: - ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG - PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS - getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG - app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache) - mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools) - importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG * fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys. * fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings: F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes() drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts. F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode instead of silently passing through without tenant injection. F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the public package API. F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized ops as a subtype. F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for authenticated requests. F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files. F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks). F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias. F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId. * fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them. Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1, messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion to fail (expected 22, got 18). * fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode * fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id, including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config, /api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant isolation. Fixes: - preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header - scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem() - updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID - $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match for better index utilization - Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts - Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js * test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions bulkWrite spec: - deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched - replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement - replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth) - empty ops array: verifies graceful handling preAuthTenant spec: - All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless) * feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js): - Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId, preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming. FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager): - getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant. GenerationJobManager: - tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata - createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata - SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access - Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId * fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime. * fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by our new imports across 8 files. * fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries, but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId. Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false). * test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js): - Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403 - Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed - OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts): - completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context - completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context - Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows Documentation: - JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement - Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site * fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404. Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant deployments", and "single-tenant mode". * fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature (streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status, verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users. F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning. F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers. F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared; other tenants expire via TTL. F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent ALS context. F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no ALS leakage across scope boundaries. * fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded). SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called. * fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log * fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a different instance without shared Keyv storage. Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since flow keys are unscoped. Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID. * fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId) causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin. * fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning * fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely. Now deletes both when in tenant context. * fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires tenant-level access control. F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__ sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for bypass probing attempts. F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant check after resolving the job. F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode. F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403. F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form. F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since middleware calls next() (not 4xx). Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated completeFlow warning message. * fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for __SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers. B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests — cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body, cross-tenant abort returns 403. C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user. D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata, matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation. * fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order - clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache deletes instead of sequential awaits - SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat behavior for untenanted legacy jobs - conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per AGENTS.md * fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available: - Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant) - InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites (/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback). Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible when the userId check passes. * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users. Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc — other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation. * fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys. F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header. F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern). F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers. F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context. F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints. F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context). * fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
2026-03-28 16:43:50 -04:00
await cache.delete(scopedCacheKey(CacheKeys.TOOLS));
logger.debug(
`[MCP Cache] Updated ${tools.length} tools for server ${serverName} (user: ${userId})`,
);
return serverTools;
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`[MCP Cache] Failed to update tools for ${serverName} (user: ${userId}):`, error);
throw error;
}
}
/**
🏗️ feat: bulkWrite isolation, pre-auth context, strict-mode fixes (#12445) * fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering, matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and updateInterfacePermissions. * fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation. * feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks, so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to native bulkWrite. Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites: - agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories) - conversation (bulkSaveConvos) - message (bulkSaveMessages) - file (batchUpdateFiles) - conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts) - aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries) systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the isolation plugin. * feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto /oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs. The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped (STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the correct login page config per tenant. The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth gateway sets the header. * feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped ADMIN/USER roles. * fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook, $lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose hooks entirely. Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active. * fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the same ID values. - agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound - convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50 already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId }) - message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165 already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId }) - preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId } compound * fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be served to all tenants. Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active. Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments). Covers all read, write, and delete sites: - ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG - PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS - getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG - app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache) - mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools) - importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG * fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys. * fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings: F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes() drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts. F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode instead of silently passing through without tenant injection. F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the public package API. F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized ops as a subtype. F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for authenticated requests. F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files. F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks). F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias. F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId. * fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them. Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1, messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion to fail (expected 22, got 18). * fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode * fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id, including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config, /api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant isolation. Fixes: - preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header - scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem() - updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID - $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match for better index utilization - Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts - Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js * test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions bulkWrite spec: - deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched - replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement - replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth) - empty ops array: verifies graceful handling preAuthTenant spec: - All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless) * feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js): - Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId, preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming. FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager): - getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant. GenerationJobManager: - tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata - createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata - SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access - Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId * fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime. * fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by our new imports across 8 files. * fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries, but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId. Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false). * test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js): - Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403 - Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed - OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts): - completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context - completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context - Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows Documentation: - JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement - Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site * fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404. Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant deployments", and "single-tenant mode". * fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature (streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status, verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users. F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning. F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers. F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared; other tenants expire via TTL. F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent ALS context. F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no ALS leakage across scope boundaries. * fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded). SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called. * fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log * fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a different instance without shared Keyv storage. Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since flow keys are unscoped. Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID. * fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId) causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin. * fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning * fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely. Now deletes both when in tenant context. * fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires tenant-level access control. F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__ sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for bypass probing attempts. F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant check after resolving the job. F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode. F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403. F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form. F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since middleware calls next() (not 4xx). Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated completeFlow warning message. * fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for __SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers. B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests — cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body, cross-tenant abort returns 403. C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user. D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata, matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation. * fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order - clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache deletes instead of sequential awaits - SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat behavior for untenanted legacy jobs - conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per AGENTS.md * fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available: - Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant) - InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites (/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback). Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible when the userId check passes. * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users. Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc — other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation. * fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys. F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header. F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern). F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers. F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context. F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints. F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context). * fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
2026-03-28 16:43:50 -04:00
* Merges app-level tools with global tools.
* Only the current ALS-scoped key (base key in system/startup context) is cleared.
* Tenant-scoped TOOLS:tenantId keys are NOT actively invalidated they expire
* via TTL on the next tenant request. This matches clearEndpointConfigCache behavior.
* @param {import('@librechat/api').LCAvailableTools} appTools
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
async function mergeAppTools(appTools) {
try {
const count = Object.keys(appTools).length;
if (!count) {
return;
}
const cachedTools = await getCachedTools();
const mergedTools = { ...cachedTools, ...appTools };
await setCachedTools(mergedTools);
const cache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.TOOL_CACHE);
🏗️ feat: bulkWrite isolation, pre-auth context, strict-mode fixes (#12445) * fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering, matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and updateInterfacePermissions. * fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation. * feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks, so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to native bulkWrite. Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites: - agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories) - conversation (bulkSaveConvos) - message (bulkSaveMessages) - file (batchUpdateFiles) - conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts) - aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries) systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the isolation plugin. * feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto /oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs. The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped (STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the correct login page config per tenant. The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth gateway sets the header. * feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped ADMIN/USER roles. * fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook, $lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose hooks entirely. Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active. * fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the same ID values. - agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound - convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50 already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId }) - message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165 already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId }) - preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId } compound * fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be served to all tenants. Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active. Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments). Covers all read, write, and delete sites: - ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG - PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS - getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG - app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache) - mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools) - importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG * fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys. * fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings: F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes() drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts. F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode instead of silently passing through without tenant injection. F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the public package API. F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized ops as a subtype. F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for authenticated requests. F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files. F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks). F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias. F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId. * fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them. Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1, messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion to fail (expected 22, got 18). * fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode * fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id, including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config, /api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant isolation. Fixes: - preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header - scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem() - updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID - $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match for better index utilization - Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts - Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js * test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions bulkWrite spec: - deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched - replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement - replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth) - empty ops array: verifies graceful handling preAuthTenant spec: - All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless) * feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js): - Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId, preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming. FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager): - getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant. GenerationJobManager: - tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata - createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata - SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access - Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId * fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime. * fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by our new imports across 8 files. * fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries, but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId. Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false). * test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js): - Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403 - Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed - OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts): - completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context - completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context - Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows Documentation: - JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement - Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site * fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404. Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant deployments", and "single-tenant mode". * fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature (streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status, verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users. F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning. F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers. F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared; other tenants expire via TTL. F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent ALS context. F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no ALS leakage across scope boundaries. * fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded). SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called. * fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log * fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a different instance without shared Keyv storage. Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since flow keys are unscoped. Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID. * fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId) causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin. * fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning * fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely. Now deletes both when in tenant context. * fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires tenant-level access control. F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__ sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for bypass probing attempts. F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant check after resolving the job. F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode. F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403. F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form. F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since middleware calls next() (not 4xx). Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated completeFlow warning message. * fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for __SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers. B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests — cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body, cross-tenant abort returns 403. C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user. D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata, matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation. * fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order - clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache deletes instead of sequential awaits - SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat behavior for untenanted legacy jobs - conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per AGENTS.md * fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available: - Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant) - InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites (/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback). Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible when the userId check passes. * fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users. Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc — other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation. * fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys. F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header. F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern). F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers. F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context. F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints. F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context). * fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
2026-03-28 16:43:50 -04:00
await cache.delete(scopedCacheKey(CacheKeys.TOOLS));
logger.debug(`Merged ${count} app-level tools`);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to merge app-level tools:', error);
throw error;
}
}
/**
* Caches MCP server tools (no longer merges with global)
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.userId - User ID for user-specific caching
* @param {string} params.serverName
* @param {import('@librechat/api').LCAvailableTools} params.serverTools
* @returns {Promise<void>}
*/
async function cacheMCPServerTools({ userId, serverName, serverTools }) {
try {
const count = Object.keys(serverTools).length;
if (!count) {
return;
}
// Only cache server-specific tools, no merging with global
await setCachedTools(serverTools, { userId, serverName });
logger.debug(`Cached ${count} MCP server tools for ${serverName} (user: ${userId})`);
} catch (error) {
logger.error(`Failed to cache MCP server tools for ${serverName} (user: ${userId}):`, error);
throw error;
}
}
module.exports = {
mergeAppTools,
cacheMCPServerTools,
updateMCPServerTools,
};