mirror of
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Enhanced ChatGPT Clone: Features Agents, MCP, DeepSeek, Anthropic, AWS, OpenAI, Responses API, Azure, Groq, o1, GPT-5, Mistral, OpenRouter, Vertex AI, Gemini, Artifacts, AI model switching, message search, Code Interpreter, langchain, DALL-E-3, OpenAPI Actions, Functions, Secure Multi-User Auth, Presets, open-source for self-hosting. Active.
https://librechat.ai/
aianthropicartifactsawsazurechatgptchatgpt-cloneclaudeclonedeepseekgeminigooglegpt-5librechatmcpo1openairesponses-apivisionwebui
877c2efc85
* fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode
seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing
every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when
TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the
SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering,
matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and
updateInterfacePermissions.
* fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth
optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant
context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware
after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with
optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation.
* feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration
Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks,
so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a
tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant
context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to
native bulkWrite.
Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites:
- agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories)
- conversation (bulkSaveConvos)
- message (bulkSaveMessages)
- file (batchUpdateFiles)
- conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts)
- aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries)
systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses
explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the
isolation plugin.
* feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache
Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request
header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto
/oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated
routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs.
The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped
(STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the
correct login page config per tenant.
The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no
OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth
gateway sets the header.
* feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions
When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside
tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries
target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets
the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call
updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped
ADMIN/USER roles.
* fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation
The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection
without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is
protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook,
$lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose
hooks entirely.
Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup
with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active.
* fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds
Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in
MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the
same ID values.
- agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound
- convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50
already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId })
- message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165
already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId })
- preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId }
compound
* fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant
These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint
settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global
cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be
served to all tenants.
Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active.
Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward
compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments).
Covers all read, write, and delete sites:
- ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG
- PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS
- getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG
- app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache)
- mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools)
- importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG
* fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock
The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all
PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls
getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys.
* fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types
Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings:
F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to
SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes()
drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts.
F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode
instead of silently passing through without tenant injection.
F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for
tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the
public package API.
F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on
bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized
ops as a subtype.
F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived
req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for
authenticated requests.
F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and
replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files.
F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the
non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks).
F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias.
F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId.
* fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture
The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them.
Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1,
messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion
to fail (expected 22, got 18).
* fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode
* fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input
CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id,
including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending
X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config,
/api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant
isolation.
Fixes:
- preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header
- scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system
context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem()
- updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
- $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match
for better index utilization
- Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts
- Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js
* test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions
bulkWrite spec:
- deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched
- replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement
- replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement
document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth)
- empty ops array: verifies graceful handling
preAuthTenant spec:
- All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify
getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the
test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless)
* feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager
MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js):
- Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId,
preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming.
FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager):
- getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant
context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant.
GenerationJobManager:
- tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata
- createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding
SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata
- SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches
req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access
- Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId
* fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks
FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped
flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas
without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime.
* fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions
Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports
sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by
our new imports across 8 files.
* fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode
serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries,
but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId.
Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the
SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false).
* test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs
SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js):
- Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403
- Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed
- OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped
FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts):
- completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context
- completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context
- Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows
Documentation:
- JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement
- Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site
* fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references
The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never
closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response
immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404.
Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test
descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant
deployments", and "single-tenant mode".
* fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs
F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature
(streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status,
verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users.
F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow
is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id
on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning.
F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects
colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims
whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers.
F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in
clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared;
other tenants expire via TTL.
F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent
ALS context.
F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without
context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no
ALS leakage across scope boundaries.
* fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing
FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks
arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry
X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows
created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no
collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded).
SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express
response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called.
* fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log
* fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test
The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only
relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated
to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a
different instance without shared Keyv storage.
Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since
flow keys are unscoped.
Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies
return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID.
* fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions
The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId)
causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding
explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin.
* fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning
* fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys
Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped
ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the
tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely.
Now deletes both when in tenant context.
* fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage
F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort
matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status
endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires
tenant-level access control.
F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__
sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for
bypass probing attempts.
F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant
check after resolving the job.
F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem
bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode.
F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403.
F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form.
F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since
middleware calls next() (not 4xx).
Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated
completeFlow warning message.
* fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency
A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for
__SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers.
B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests —
cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body,
cross-tenant abort returns 403.
C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId)
matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user.
D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata,
matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation.
* fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests
* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order
- clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache
deletes instead of sequential awaits
- SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat
behavior for untenanted legacy jobs
- conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per
AGENTS.md
* fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat
Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available:
- Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to
stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant)
- InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap
getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId
parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites
(/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback).
Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the
backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible
when the userId check passes.
* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order
Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use
the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents
orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users.
Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc —
other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation.
* fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs
F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap
before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from
accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys.
F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds
operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header.
F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are
not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern).
F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId
(not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers.
F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context.
F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical
inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints.
F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context
and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context).
* fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
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| .devcontainer | ||
| .github | ||
| .husky | ||
| .vscode | ||
| api | ||
| client | ||
| config | ||
| e2e | ||
| helm | ||
| packages | ||
| redis-config | ||
| src/tests | ||
| utils | ||
| .dockerignore | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitattributes | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .prettierrc | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| bun.lock | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| deploy-compose.yml | ||
| docker-compose.override.yml.example | ||
| docker-compose.yml | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| Dockerfile.multi | ||
| eslint.config.mjs | ||
| librechat.example.yaml | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| package-lock.json | ||
| package.json | ||
| rag.yml | ||
| README.md | ||
| README.zh.md | ||
| turbo.json | ||
LibreChat
English · 中文
✨ Features
-
🖥️ UI & Experience inspired by ChatGPT with enhanced design and features
-
🤖 AI Model Selection:
- Anthropic (Claude), AWS Bedrock, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Google, Vertex AI, OpenAI Responses API (incl. Azure)
- Custom Endpoints: Use any OpenAI-compatible API with LibreChat, no proxy required
- Compatible with Local & Remote AI Providers:
- Ollama, groq, Cohere, Mistral AI, Apple MLX, koboldcpp, together.ai,
- OpenRouter, Helicone, Perplexity, ShuttleAI, Deepseek, Qwen, and more
-
- Secure, Sandboxed Execution in Python, Node.js (JS/TS), Go, C/C++, Java, PHP, Rust, and Fortran
- Seamless File Handling: Upload, process, and download files directly
- No Privacy Concerns: Fully isolated and secure execution
-
🔦 Agents & Tools Integration:
- LibreChat Agents:
- No-Code Custom Assistants: Build specialized, AI-driven helpers
- Agent Marketplace: Discover and deploy community-built agents
- Collaborative Sharing: Share agents with specific users and groups
- Flexible & Extensible: Use MCP Servers, tools, file search, code execution, and more
- Compatible with Custom Endpoints, OpenAI, Azure, Anthropic, AWS Bedrock, Google, Vertex AI, Responses API, and more
- Model Context Protocol (MCP) Support for Tools
- LibreChat Agents:
-
🔍 Web Search:
- Search the internet and retrieve relevant information to enhance your AI context
- Combines search providers, content scrapers, and result rerankers for optimal results
- Customizable Jina Reranking: Configure custom Jina API URLs for reranking services
- Learn More →
-
🪄 Generative UI with Code Artifacts:
- Code Artifacts allow creation of React, HTML, and Mermaid diagrams directly in chat
-
🎨 Image Generation & Editing
- Text-to-image and image-to-image with GPT-Image-1
- Text-to-image with DALL-E (3/2), Stable Diffusion, Flux, or any MCP server
- Produce stunning visuals from prompts or refine existing images with a single instruction
-
💾 Presets & Context Management:
- Create, Save, & Share Custom Presets
- Switch between AI Endpoints and Presets mid-chat
- Edit, Resubmit, and Continue Messages with Conversation branching
- Create and share prompts with specific users and groups
- Fork Messages & Conversations for Advanced Context control
-
💬 Multimodal & File Interactions:
- Upload and analyze images with Claude 3, GPT-4.5, GPT-4o, o1, Llama-Vision, and Gemini 📸
- Chat with Files using Custom Endpoints, OpenAI, Azure, Anthropic, AWS Bedrock, & Google 🗃️
-
🌎 Multilingual UI:
- English, 中文 (简体), 中文 (繁體), العربية, Deutsch, Español, Français, Italiano
- Polski, Português (PT), Português (BR), Русский, 日本語, Svenska, 한국어, Tiếng Việt
- Türkçe, Nederlands, עברית, Català, Čeština, Dansk, Eesti, فارسی
- Suomi, Magyar, Հայերեն, Bahasa Indonesia, ქართული, Latviešu, ไทย, ئۇيغۇرچە
-
🧠 Reasoning UI:
- Dynamic Reasoning UI for Chain-of-Thought/Reasoning AI models like DeepSeek-R1
-
🎨 Customizable Interface:
- Customizable Dropdown & Interface that adapts to both power users and newcomers
-
- Never lose a response: AI responses automatically reconnect and resume if your connection drops
- Multi-Tab & Multi-Device Sync: Open the same chat in multiple tabs or pick up on another device
- Production-Ready: Works from single-server setups to horizontally scaled deployments with Redis
-
🗣️ Speech & Audio:
- Chat hands-free with Speech-to-Text and Text-to-Speech
- Automatically send and play Audio
- Supports OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, and Elevenlabs
-
📥 Import & Export Conversations:
- Import Conversations from LibreChat, ChatGPT, Chatbot UI
- Export conversations as screenshots, markdown, text, json
-
🔍 Search & Discovery:
- Search all messages/conversations
-
👥 Multi-User & Secure Access:
- Multi-User, Secure Authentication with OAuth2, LDAP, & Email Login Support
- Built-in Moderation, and Token spend tools
-
⚙️ Configuration & Deployment:
- Configure Proxy, Reverse Proxy, Docker, & many Deployment options
- Use completely local or deploy on the cloud
-
📖 Open-Source & Community:
- Completely Open-Source & Built in Public
- Community-driven development, support, and feedback
For a thorough review of our features, see our docs here 📚
🪶 All-In-One AI Conversations with LibreChat
LibreChat is a self-hosted AI chat platform that unifies all major AI providers in a single, privacy-focused interface.
Beyond chat, LibreChat provides AI Agents, Model Context Protocol (MCP) support, Artifacts, Code Interpreter, custom actions, conversation search, and enterprise-ready multi-user authentication.
Open source, actively developed, and built for anyone who values control over their AI infrastructure.
🌐 Resources
GitHub Repo:
- RAG API: github.com/danny-avila/rag_api
- Website: github.com/LibreChat-AI/librechat.ai
Other:
- Website: librechat.ai
- Documentation: librechat.ai/docs
- Blog: librechat.ai/blog
📝 Changelog
Keep up with the latest updates by visiting the releases page and notes:
⚠️ Please consult the changelog for breaking changes before updating.
⭐ Star History
✨ Contributions
Contributions, suggestions, bug reports and fixes are welcome!
For new features, components, or extensions, please open an issue and discuss before sending a PR.
If you'd like to help translate LibreChat into your language, we'd love your contribution! Improving our translations not only makes LibreChat more accessible to users around the world but also enhances the overall user experience. Please check out our Translation Guide.
💖 This project exists in its current state thanks to all the people who contribute
🎉 Special Thanks
We thank Locize for their translation management tools that support multiple languages in LibreChat.