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* 🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService Two independent bugs in `api/server/services/AuthService.js` cause complete authentication failure when using `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true` with Microsoft Entra ID (or Auth0) on `http://localhost` with `NODE_ENV=production`: Bug 1: `secure: isProduction` prevents auth cookies on localhost PR #11518 introduced `shouldUseSecureCookie()` in `socialLogins.js` to handle the case where `NODE_ENV=production` but the server runs on `http://localhost`. However, `AuthService.js` was not updated — it still used `secure: isProduction` in 6 cookie locations across `setAuthTokens()` and `setOpenIDAuthTokens()`. The `token_provider` cookie being dropped is critical: without it, `requireJwtAuth` middleware defaults to the `jwt` strategy instead of `openidJwt`, causing all authenticated requests to return 401. Bug 2: `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` returns `access_token` instead of `id_token` The `openIdJwtStrategy` validates the Bearer token via JWKS. For Entra ID without `OPENID_AUDIENCE`, the `access_token` is a Microsoft Graph API token (opaque or signed for a different audience), which fails JWKS validation. The `id_token` is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's `client_id` as audience — which is what the strategy expects. This is the same root cause as issue #8796 (Auth0 encrypted access tokens). Changes: - Consolidate `shouldUseSecureCookie()` into `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` as a shared, typed utility exported from `@librechat/api`, replacing the duplicate definitions in `AuthService.js` and `socialLogins.js` - Move `isProduction` check inside the function body so it is evaluated at call time rather than module load time - Fix `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` which also used bare `secure: isProduction` for CSRF and session cookies (same localhost bug) - Return `tokenset.id_token || tokenset.access_token` from `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` so JWKS validation works with standard OIDC providers; falls back to `access_token` for backward compatibility - Add 15 tests for `shouldUseSecureCookie()` covering production/dev modes, localhost variants, edge cases, and a documented IPv6 bracket limitation - Add 13 tests for `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` covering token selection, session storage, cookie secure flag delegation, and edge cases Refs: #8796, #11518, #11236, #9931 * chore: Adjust Import Order and Type Definitions in AgentPanel Component - Reordered imports in `AgentPanel.tsx` for better organization and clarity. - Updated type imports to ensure proper usage of `FieldNamesMarkedBoolean` and `TranslationKeys`. - Removed redundant imports to streamline the codebase.
119 lines
4 KiB
TypeScript
119 lines
4 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto';
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import type { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
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export const OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE = 'oauth_csrf';
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export const OAUTH_CSRF_MAX_AGE = 10 * 60 * 1000;
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export const OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE = 'oauth_session';
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export const OAUTH_SESSION_MAX_AGE = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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export const OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE_PATH = '/api';
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/**
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* Determines if secure cookies should be used.
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* Returns `true` in production unless the server is running on localhost (HTTP).
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* This allows cookies to work on `http://localhost` during local development
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* even when `NODE_ENV=production` (common in Docker Compose setups).
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*/
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export function shouldUseSecureCookie(): boolean {
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const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
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const domainServer = process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER || '';
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let hostname = '';
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if (domainServer) {
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try {
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const normalized = /^https?:\/\//i.test(domainServer)
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? domainServer
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: `http://${domainServer}`;
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const url = new URL(normalized);
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hostname = (url.hostname || '').toLowerCase();
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} catch {
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hostname = domainServer.toLowerCase();
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}
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}
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const isLocalhost =
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hostname === 'localhost' ||
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hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
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hostname === '::1' ||
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hostname.endsWith('.localhost');
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return isProduction && !isLocalhost;
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}
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/** Generates an HMAC-based token for OAuth CSRF protection */
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export function generateOAuthCsrfToken(flowId: string, secret?: string): string {
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const key = secret || process.env.JWT_SECRET;
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if (!key) {
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throw new Error('JWT_SECRET is required for OAuth CSRF token generation');
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}
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return crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(flowId).digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
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}
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/** Sets a SameSite=Lax CSRF cookie bound to a specific OAuth flow */
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export function setOAuthCsrfCookie(res: Response, flowId: string, cookiePath: string): void {
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res.cookie(OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, generateOAuthCsrfToken(flowId), {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: OAUTH_CSRF_MAX_AGE,
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path: cookiePath,
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});
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}
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/**
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* Validates the per-flow CSRF cookie against the expected HMAC.
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* Uses timing-safe comparison and always clears the cookie to prevent replay.
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*/
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export function validateOAuthCsrf(
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req: Request,
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res: Response,
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flowId: string,
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cookiePath: string,
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): boolean {
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const cookie = (req.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined)?.[OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE];
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res.clearCookie(OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, { path: cookiePath });
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if (!cookie) {
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return false;
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}
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const expected = generateOAuthCsrfToken(flowId);
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if (cookie.length !== expected.length) {
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return false;
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}
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(cookie), Buffer.from(expected));
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}
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/**
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* Express middleware that sets the OAuth session cookie after JWT authentication.
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* Chain after requireJwtAuth on routes that precede an OAuth redirect (e.g., reinitialize, bind).
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*/
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export function setOAuthSession(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
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const user = (req as Request & { user?: { id?: string } }).user;
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if (user?.id && !(req.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined)?.[OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE]) {
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setOAuthSessionCookie(res, user.id);
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}
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next();
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}
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/** Sets a SameSite=Lax session cookie that binds the browser to the authenticated userId */
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export function setOAuthSessionCookie(res: Response, userId: string): void {
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res.cookie(OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE, generateOAuthCsrfToken(userId), {
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: shouldUseSecureCookie(),
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: OAUTH_SESSION_MAX_AGE,
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path: OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE_PATH,
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});
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}
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/** Validates the session cookie against the expected userId using timing-safe comparison */
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export function validateOAuthSession(req: Request, userId: string): boolean {
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const cookie = (req.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined)?.[OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE];
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if (!cookie) {
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return false;
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}
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const expected = generateOAuthCsrfToken(userId);
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if (cookie.length !== expected.length) {
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return false;
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}
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return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(cookie), Buffer.from(expected));
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}
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