LibreChat/packages/data-provider/src/utils.ts
Danny Avila 951d261f5c
🧯 fix: Prevent Env-Variable Exfil. via Placeholder Injection (#12260)
* 🔒 fix: Resolve env vars before body placeholder expansion to prevent secret exfiltration

Body placeholders ({{LIBRECHAT_BODY_*}}) were substituted before
extractEnvVariable ran, allowing user-controlled body fields containing
${SECRET} patterns to be expanded into real environment values in
outbound headers. Reorder so env vars resolve first, preventing
untrusted input from triggering env expansion.

* 🛡️ fix: Block sensitive infrastructure env vars from placeholder resolution

Add isSensitiveEnvVar blocklist to extractEnvVariable so that internal
infrastructure secrets (JWT_SECRET, JWT_REFRESH_SECRET, CREDS_KEY,
CREDS_IV, MEILI_MASTER_KEY, MONGO_URI, REDIS_URI, REDIS_PASSWORD)
can never be resolved via ${VAR} expansion — even if an attacker
manages to inject a placeholder pattern.

Uses exact-match set (not substring patterns) to avoid breaking
legitimate operator config that references OAuth/API secrets in
MCP and custom endpoint configurations.

* 🧹 test: Rename ANOTHER_SECRET test fixture to ANOTHER_VALUE

Avoid using SECRET-containing names for non-sensitive test fixtures
to prevent confusion with the new isSensitiveEnvVar blocklist.

* 🔒 fix: Resolve env vars before all user-controlled substitutions in processSingleValue

Move extractEnvVariable to run on the raw admin-authored template
BEFORE customUserVars, user fields, OIDC tokens, and body placeholders.

Previously env resolution ran after customUserVars, so a user setting
a custom MCP variable to "${SECRET}" could still trigger env expansion.
Now env vars are resolved strictly on operator config, and all
subsequent user-controlled substitutions cannot introduce ${VAR} patterns
that would be expanded.

Gated by !dbSourced so DB-stored servers continue to skip env resolution.
Adds a security-invariant comment documenting the ordering requirement.

* 🧪 test: Comprehensive security regression tests for placeholder injection

- Cover all three body fields (conversationId, parentMessageId, messageId)
- Add user-field injection test (user.name containing ${VAR})
- Add customUserVars injection test (MY_TOKEN = "${VAR}")
- Add processMCPEnv injection tests for body and customUserVars paths
- Remove redundant process.env setup/teardown already handled by beforeEach/afterEach

* 🧹 chore: Add REDIS_PASSWORD to blocklist integration test; document customUserVars gate
2026-03-16 08:48:24 -04:00

85 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript

export const envVarRegex = /^\${(.+)}$/;
/**
* Infrastructure env vars that must never be resolved via placeholder expansion.
* These are internal secrets whose exposure would compromise the system —
* they have no legitimate reason to appear in outbound headers, MCP env/args, or OAuth config.
*
* Intentionally excludes API keys (operators reference them in config) and
* OAuth/session secrets (referenced in MCP OAuth config via processMCPEnv).
*/
const SENSITIVE_ENV_VARS = new Set([
'JWT_SECRET',
'JWT_REFRESH_SECRET',
'CREDS_KEY',
'CREDS_IV',
'MEILI_MASTER_KEY',
'MONGO_URI',
'REDIS_URI',
'REDIS_PASSWORD',
]);
/** Returns true when `varName` refers to an infrastructure secret that must not leak. */
export function isSensitiveEnvVar(varName: string): boolean {
return SENSITIVE_ENV_VARS.has(varName);
}
/** Extracts the environment variable name from a template literal string */
export function extractVariableName(value: string): string | null {
if (!value) {
return null;
}
const match = value.trim().match(envVarRegex);
return match ? match[1] : null;
}
/** Extracts the value of an environment variable from a string. */
export function extractEnvVariable(value: string) {
if (!value) {
return value;
}
const trimmed = value.trim();
const singleMatch = trimmed.match(envVarRegex);
if (singleMatch) {
const varName = singleMatch[1];
if (isSensitiveEnvVar(varName)) {
return trimmed;
}
return process.env[varName] || trimmed;
}
const regex = /\${([^}]+)}/g;
let result = trimmed;
const matches = [];
let match;
while ((match = regex.exec(trimmed)) !== null) {
matches.push({
fullMatch: match[0],
varName: match[1],
index: match.index,
});
}
for (let i = matches.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const { fullMatch, varName, index } = matches[i];
if (isSensitiveEnvVar(varName)) {
continue;
}
const envValue = process.env[varName] || fullMatch;
result = result.substring(0, index) + envValue + result.substring(index + fullMatch.length);
}
return result;
}
/**
* Normalize the endpoint name to system-expected value.
* @param name
*/
export function normalizeEndpointName(name = ''): string {
return name.toLowerCase() === 'ollama' ? 'ollama' : name;
}