mirror of
https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat.git
synced 2026-04-03 22:37:20 +02:00
* fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode
seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing
every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when
TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the
SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering,
matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and
updateInterfacePermissions.
* fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth
optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant
context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware
after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with
optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation.
* feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration
Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks,
so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a
tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant
context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to
native bulkWrite.
Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites:
- agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories)
- conversation (bulkSaveConvos)
- message (bulkSaveMessages)
- file (batchUpdateFiles)
- conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts)
- aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries)
systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses
explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the
isolation plugin.
* feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache
Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request
header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto
/oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated
routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs.
The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped
(STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the
correct login page config per tenant.
The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no
OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth
gateway sets the header.
* feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions
When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside
tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries
target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets
the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call
updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped
ADMIN/USER roles.
* fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation
The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection
without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is
protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook,
$lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose
hooks entirely.
Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup
with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active.
* fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds
Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in
MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the
same ID values.
- agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound
- convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50
already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId })
- message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165
already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId })
- preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId }
compound
* fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant
These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint
settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global
cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be
served to all tenants.
Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active.
Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward
compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments).
Covers all read, write, and delete sites:
- ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG
- PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS
- getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG
- app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache)
- mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools)
- importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG
* fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock
The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all
PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls
getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys.
* fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types
Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings:
F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to
SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes()
drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts.
F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode
instead of silently passing through without tenant injection.
F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for
tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the
public package API.
F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on
bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized
ops as a subtype.
F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived
req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for
authenticated requests.
F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and
replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files.
F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the
non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks).
F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias.
F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId.
* fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture
The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them.
Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1,
messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion
to fail (expected 22, got 18).
* fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode
* fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input
CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id,
including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending
X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config,
/api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant
isolation.
Fixes:
- preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header
- scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system
context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem()
- updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
- $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match
for better index utilization
- Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts
- Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js
* test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions
bulkWrite spec:
- deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched
- replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement
- replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement
document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth)
- empty ops array: verifies graceful handling
preAuthTenant spec:
- All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify
getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the
test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless)
* feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager
MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js):
- Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId,
preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming.
FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager):
- getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant
context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant.
GenerationJobManager:
- tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata
- createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding
SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata
- SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches
req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access
- Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId
* fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks
FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped
flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas
without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime.
* fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions
Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports
sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by
our new imports across 8 files.
* fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode
serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries,
but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId.
Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the
SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false).
* test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs
SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js):
- Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403
- Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed
- OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped
FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts):
- completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context
- completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context
- Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows
Documentation:
- JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement
- Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site
* fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references
The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never
closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response
immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404.
Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test
descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant
deployments", and "single-tenant mode".
* fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs
F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature
(streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status,
verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users.
F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow
is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id
on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning.
F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects
colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims
whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers.
F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in
clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared;
other tenants expire via TTL.
F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent
ALS context.
F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without
context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no
ALS leakage across scope boundaries.
* fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing
FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks
arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry
X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows
created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no
collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded).
SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express
response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called.
* fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log
* fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test
The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only
relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated
to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a
different instance without shared Keyv storage.
Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since
flow keys are unscoped.
Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies
return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID.
* fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions
The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId)
causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding
explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin.
* fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning
* fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys
Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped
ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the
tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely.
Now deletes both when in tenant context.
* fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage
F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort
matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status
endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires
tenant-level access control.
F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__
sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for
bypass probing attempts.
F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant
check after resolving the job.
F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem
bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode.
F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403.
F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form.
F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since
middleware calls next() (not 4xx).
Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated
completeFlow warning message.
* fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency
A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for
__SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers.
B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests —
cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body,
cross-tenant abort returns 403.
C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId)
matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user.
D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata,
matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation.
* fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests
* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order
- clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache
deletes instead of sequential awaits
- SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat
behavior for untenanted legacy jobs
- conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per
AGENTS.md
* fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat
Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available:
- Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to
stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant)
- InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap
getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId
parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites
(/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback).
Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the
backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible
when the userId check passes.
* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order
Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use
the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents
orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users.
Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc —
other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation.
* fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs
F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap
before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from
accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys.
F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds
operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header.
F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are
not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern).
F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId
(not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers.
F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context.
F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical
inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints.
F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context
and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context).
* fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
156 lines
5.9 KiB
JavaScript
156 lines
5.9 KiB
JavaScript
const express = require('express');
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const { isEnabled, getBalanceConfig } = require('@librechat/api');
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const { CacheKeys, defaultSocialLogins } = require('librechat-data-provider');
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const { logger, getTenantId, scopedCacheKey } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
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const { getLdapConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config/ldap');
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const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config/app');
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const { getLogStores } = require('~/cache');
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const router = express.Router();
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const emailLoginEnabled =
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process.env.ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN === undefined || isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_EMAIL_LOGIN);
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const passwordResetEnabled = isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_PASSWORD_RESET);
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const sharedLinksEnabled =
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process.env.ALLOW_SHARED_LINKS === undefined || isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_SHARED_LINKS);
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const publicSharedLinksEnabled =
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sharedLinksEnabled && isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_SHARED_LINKS_PUBLIC);
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const sharePointFilePickerEnabled = isEnabled(process.env.ENABLE_SHAREPOINT_FILEPICKER);
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const openidReuseTokens = isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS);
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router.get('/', async function (req, res) {
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const cache = getLogStores(CacheKeys.CONFIG_STORE);
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const cacheKey = scopedCacheKey(CacheKeys.STARTUP_CONFIG);
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const cachedStartupConfig = await cache.get(cacheKey);
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if (cachedStartupConfig) {
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res.send(cachedStartupConfig);
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return;
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}
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const isBirthday = () => {
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const today = new Date();
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return today.getMonth() === 1 && today.getDate() === 11;
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};
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const ldap = getLdapConfig();
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try {
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const appConfig = await getAppConfig({
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role: req.user?.role,
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tenantId: req.user?.tenantId || getTenantId(),
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});
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const isOpenIdEnabled =
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!!process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_ID &&
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!!process.env.OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET &&
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!!process.env.OPENID_ISSUER &&
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!!process.env.OPENID_SESSION_SECRET;
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const isSamlEnabled =
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!!process.env.SAML_ENTRY_POINT &&
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!!process.env.SAML_ISSUER &&
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!!process.env.SAML_CERT &&
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!!process.env.SAML_SESSION_SECRET;
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const balanceConfig = getBalanceConfig(appConfig);
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/** @type {TStartupConfig} */
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const payload = {
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appTitle: process.env.APP_TITLE || 'LibreChat',
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socialLogins: appConfig?.registration?.socialLogins ?? defaultSocialLogins,
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discordLoginEnabled: !!process.env.DISCORD_CLIENT_ID && !!process.env.DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET,
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facebookLoginEnabled:
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!!process.env.FACEBOOK_CLIENT_ID && !!process.env.FACEBOOK_CLIENT_SECRET,
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githubLoginEnabled: !!process.env.GITHUB_CLIENT_ID && !!process.env.GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET,
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googleLoginEnabled: !!process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID && !!process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET,
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appleLoginEnabled:
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!!process.env.APPLE_CLIENT_ID &&
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!!process.env.APPLE_TEAM_ID &&
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!!process.env.APPLE_KEY_ID &&
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!!process.env.APPLE_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH,
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openidLoginEnabled: isOpenIdEnabled,
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openidLabel: process.env.OPENID_BUTTON_LABEL || 'Continue with OpenID',
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openidImageUrl: process.env.OPENID_IMAGE_URL,
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openidAutoRedirect: isEnabled(process.env.OPENID_AUTO_REDIRECT),
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samlLoginEnabled: !isOpenIdEnabled && isSamlEnabled,
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samlLabel: process.env.SAML_BUTTON_LABEL,
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samlImageUrl: process.env.SAML_IMAGE_URL,
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serverDomain: process.env.DOMAIN_SERVER || 'http://localhost:3080',
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emailLoginEnabled,
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registrationEnabled: !ldap?.enabled && isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_REGISTRATION),
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socialLoginEnabled: isEnabled(process.env.ALLOW_SOCIAL_LOGIN),
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emailEnabled:
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(!!process.env.EMAIL_SERVICE || !!process.env.EMAIL_HOST) &&
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!!process.env.EMAIL_USERNAME &&
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!!process.env.EMAIL_PASSWORD &&
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!!process.env.EMAIL_FROM,
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passwordResetEnabled,
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showBirthdayIcon:
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isBirthday() ||
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isEnabled(process.env.SHOW_BIRTHDAY_ICON) ||
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process.env.SHOW_BIRTHDAY_ICON === '',
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helpAndFaqURL: process.env.HELP_AND_FAQ_URL || 'https://librechat.ai',
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interface: appConfig?.interfaceConfig,
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turnstile: appConfig?.turnstileConfig,
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modelSpecs: appConfig?.modelSpecs,
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balance: balanceConfig,
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sharedLinksEnabled,
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publicSharedLinksEnabled,
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analyticsGtmId: process.env.ANALYTICS_GTM_ID,
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bundlerURL: process.env.SANDPACK_BUNDLER_URL,
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staticBundlerURL: process.env.SANDPACK_STATIC_BUNDLER_URL,
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sharePointFilePickerEnabled,
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sharePointBaseUrl: process.env.SHAREPOINT_BASE_URL,
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sharePointPickerGraphScope: process.env.SHAREPOINT_PICKER_GRAPH_SCOPE,
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sharePointPickerSharePointScope: process.env.SHAREPOINT_PICKER_SHAREPOINT_SCOPE,
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openidReuseTokens,
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conversationImportMaxFileSize: process.env.CONVERSATION_IMPORT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES
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? parseInt(process.env.CONVERSATION_IMPORT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES, 10)
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: 0,
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};
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const minPasswordLength = parseInt(process.env.MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, 10);
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if (minPasswordLength && !isNaN(minPasswordLength)) {
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payload.minPasswordLength = minPasswordLength;
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}
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const webSearchConfig = appConfig?.webSearch;
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if (
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webSearchConfig != null &&
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(webSearchConfig.searchProvider ||
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webSearchConfig.scraperProvider ||
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webSearchConfig.rerankerType)
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) {
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payload.webSearch = {};
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}
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if (webSearchConfig?.searchProvider) {
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payload.webSearch.searchProvider = webSearchConfig.searchProvider;
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}
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if (webSearchConfig?.scraperProvider) {
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payload.webSearch.scraperProvider = webSearchConfig.scraperProvider;
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}
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if (webSearchConfig?.rerankerType) {
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payload.webSearch.rerankerType = webSearchConfig.rerankerType;
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}
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if (ldap) {
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payload.ldap = ldap;
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}
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if (typeof process.env.CUSTOM_FOOTER === 'string') {
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payload.customFooter = process.env.CUSTOM_FOOTER;
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}
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await cache.set(cacheKey, payload);
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return res.status(200).send(payload);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error('Error in startup config', err);
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return res.status(500).send({ error: err.message });
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}
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});
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module.exports = router;
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