LibreChat/api/server/routes/agents/index.js
Danny Avila 877c2efc85
🏗️ feat: bulkWrite isolation, pre-auth context, strict-mode fixes (#12445)
* fix: wrap seedDatabase() in runAsSystem() for strict tenant mode

seedDatabase() was called without tenant context at startup, causing
every Mongoose operation inside it to throw when
TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT=true. Wrapping in runAsSystem() gives it the
SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel so the isolation plugin skips filtering,
matching the pattern already used for performStartupChecks and
updateInterfacePermissions.

* fix: chain tenantContextMiddleware in optionalJwtAuth

optionalJwtAuth populated req.user but never established ALS tenant
context, unlike requireJwtAuth which chains tenantContextMiddleware
after successful auth. Authenticated users hitting routes with
optionalJwtAuth (e.g. /api/banner) had no tenant isolation.

* feat: tenant-safe bulkWrite wrapper and call-site migration

Mongoose's bulkWrite() does not trigger schema-level middleware hooks,
so the applyTenantIsolation plugin cannot intercept it. This adds a
tenantSafeBulkWrite() utility that injects the current ALS tenant
context into every operation's filter/document before delegating to
native bulkWrite.

Migrates all 8 runtime bulkWrite call sites:
- agentCategory (seedCategories, ensureDefaultCategories)
- conversation (bulkSaveConvos)
- message (bulkSaveMessages)
- file (batchUpdateFiles)
- conversationTag (updateTagsForConversation, bulkIncrementTagCounts)
- aclEntry (bulkWriteAclEntries)

systemGrant.seedSystemGrants is intentionally not migrated — it uses
explicit tenantId: { $exists: false } filters and is exempt from the
isolation plugin.

* feat: pre-auth tenant middleware and tenant-scoped config cache

Adds preAuthTenantMiddleware that reads X-Tenant-Id from the request
header and wraps downstream in tenantStorage ALS context. Wired onto
/oauth, /api/auth, /api/config, and /api/share — unauthenticated
routes that need tenant scoping before JWT auth runs.

The /api/config cache key is now tenant-scoped
(STARTUP_CONFIG:${tenantId}) so multi-tenant deployments serve the
correct login page config per tenant.

The middleware is intentionally minimal — no subdomain parsing, no
OIDC claim extraction. The private fork's reverse proxy or auth
gateway sets the header.

* feat: accept optional tenantId in updateInterfacePermissions

When tenantId is provided, the function re-enters inside
tenantStorage.run({ tenantId }) so all downstream Mongoose queries
target that tenant's roles instead of the system context. This lets
the private fork's tenant provisioning flow call
updateInterfacePermissions per-tenant after creating tenant-scoped
ADMIN/USER roles.

* fix: tenant-filter $lookup in getPromptGroup aggregation

The $lookup stage in getPromptGroup() queried the prompts collection
without tenant filtering. While the outer PromptGroup aggregate is
protected by the tenantIsolation plugin's pre('aggregate') hook,
$lookup runs as an internal MongoDB operation that bypasses Mongoose
hooks entirely.

Converts from simple field-based $lookup to pipeline-based $lookup
with an explicit tenantId match when tenant context is active.

* fix: replace field-level unique indexes with tenant-scoped compounds

Field-level unique:true creates a globally-unique single-field index in
MongoDB, which would cause insert failures across tenants sharing the
same ID values.

- agent.id: removed field-level unique, added { id, tenantId } compound
- convo.conversationId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 50
  already exists: { conversationId, user, tenantId })
- message.messageId: removed field-level unique (compound at line 165
  already exists: { messageId, user, tenantId })
- preset.presetId: removed field-level unique, added { presetId, tenantId }
  compound

* fix: scope MODELS_CONFIG, ENDPOINT_CONFIG, PLUGINS, TOOLS caches by tenant

These caches store per-tenant configuration (available models, endpoint
settings, plugin availability, tool definitions) but were using global
cache keys. In multi-tenant mode, one tenant's cached config would be
served to all tenants.

Appends :${tenantId} to cache keys when tenant context is active.
Falls back to the unscoped key when no tenant context exists (backward
compatible for single-tenant OSS deployments).

Covers all read, write, and delete sites:
- ModelController.js: get/set MODELS_CONFIG
- PluginController.js: get/set PLUGINS, get/set TOOLS
- getEndpointsConfig.js: get/set/delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG
- app.js: delete ENDPOINT_CONFIG (clearEndpointConfigCache)
- mcp.js: delete TOOLS (updateMCPTools, mergeAppTools)
- importers.js: get ENDPOINT_CONFIG

* fix: add getTenantId to PluginController spec mock

The data-schemas mock was missing getTenantId, causing all
PluginController tests to throw when the controller calls
getTenantId() for tenant-scoped cache keys.

* fix: address review findings — migration, strict-mode, DRY, types

Addresses all CRITICAL, MAJOR, and MINOR review findings:

F1 (CRITICAL): Add agents, conversations, messages, presets to
SUPERSEDED_INDEXES in tenantIndexes.ts so dropSupersededTenantIndexes()
drops the old single-field unique indexes that block multi-tenant inserts.

F2 (CRITICAL): Unknown bulkWrite op types now throw in strict mode
instead of silently passing through without tenant injection.

F3 (MAJOR): Replace wildcard export with named export for
tenantSafeBulkWrite, hiding _resetBulkWriteStrictCache from the
public package API.

F5 (MAJOR): Restore AnyBulkWriteOperation<IAclEntry>[] typing on
bulkWriteAclEntries — the unparameterized wrapper accepts parameterized
ops as a subtype.

F7 (MAJOR): Fix config.js tenant precedence — JWT-derived
req.user.tenantId now takes priority over the X-Tenant-Id header for
authenticated requests.

F8 (MINOR): Extract scopedCacheKey() helper into tenantContext.ts and
replace all 11 inline occurrences across 7 files.

F9 (MINOR): Use simple localField/foreignField $lookup for the
non-tenant getPromptGroup path (more efficient index seeks).

F12 (NIT): Remove redundant BulkOp type alias.
F13 (NIT): Remove debug log that leaked raw tenantId.

* fix: add new superseded indexes to tenantIndexes test fixture

The test creates old indexes to verify the migration drops them.
Missing fixture entries for agents.id_1, conversations.conversationId_1,
messages.messageId_1, and presets.presetId_1 caused the count assertion
to fail (expected 22, got 18).

* fix: restore logger.warn for unknown bulk op types in non-strict mode

* fix: block SYSTEM_TENANT_ID sentinel from external header input

CRITICAL: preAuthTenantMiddleware accepted any string as X-Tenant-Id,
including '__SYSTEM__'. The tenantIsolation plugin treats SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
as an explicit bypass — skipping ALL query filters. A client sending
X-Tenant-Id: __SYSTEM__ to pre-auth routes (/api/share, /api/config,
/api/auth, /oauth) would execute Mongoose operations without tenant
isolation.

Fixes:
- preAuthTenantMiddleware rejects SYSTEM_TENANT_ID in header
- scopedCacheKey returns the base key (not key:__SYSTEM__) in system
  context, preventing stale cache entries during runAsSystem()
- updateInterfacePermissions guards tenantId against SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
- $lookup pipeline separates $expr join from constant tenantId match
  for better index utilization
- Regression test for sentinel rejection in preAuthTenant.spec.ts
- Remove redundant getTenantId() call in config.js

* test: add missing deleteMany/replaceOne coverage, fix vacuous ALS assertions

bulkWrite spec:
- deleteMany: verifies tenant-scoped deletion leaves other tenants untouched
- replaceOne: verifies tenantId injected into both filter and replacement
- replaceOne overwrite: verifies a conflicting tenantId in the replacement
  document is overwritten by the ALS tenant (defense-in-depth)
- empty ops array: verifies graceful handling

preAuthTenant spec:
- All negative-case tests now use the capturedNext pattern to verify
  getTenantId() inside the middleware's execution context, not the
  test runner's outer frame (which was always undefined regardless)

* feat: tenant-isolate MESSAGES cache, FLOWS cache, and GenerationJobManager

MESSAGES cache (streamAudio.js):
- Cache key now uses scopedCacheKey(messageId) to prefix with tenantId,
  preventing cross-tenant message content reads during TTS streaming.

FLOWS cache (FlowStateManager):
- getFlowKey() now generates ${type}:${tenantId}:${flowId} when tenant
  context is active, isolating OAuth flow state per tenant.

GenerationJobManager:
- tenantId added to SerializableJobData and GenerationJobMetadata
- createJob() captures the current ALS tenant context (excluding
  SYSTEM_TENANT_ID) and stores it in job metadata
- SSE subscription endpoint validates job.metadata.tenantId matches
  req.user.tenantId, blocking cross-tenant stream access
- Both InMemoryJobStore and RedisJobStore updated to accept tenantId

* fix: add getTenantId and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID to MCP OAuth test mocks

FlowStateManager.getFlowKey() now calls getTenantId() for tenant-scoped
flow keys. The 4 MCP OAuth test files mock @librechat/data-schemas
without these exports, causing TypeError at runtime.

* fix: correct import ordering per AGENTS.md conventions

Package imports sorted shortest to longest line length, local imports
sorted longest to shortest — fixes ordering violations introduced by
our new imports across 8 files.

* fix: deserialize tenantId in RedisJobStore — cross-tenant SSE guard was no-op in Redis mode

serializeJob() writes tenantId to the Redis hash via Object.entries,
but deserializeJob() manually enumerates fields and omitted tenantId.
Every getJob() from Redis returned tenantId: undefined, causing the
SSE route's cross-tenant guard to short-circuit (undefined && ... → false).

* test: SSE tenant guard, FlowStateManager key consistency, ALS scope docs

SSE stream tenant tests (streamTenant.spec.js):
- Cross-tenant user accessing another tenant's stream → 403
- Same-tenant user accessing own stream → allowed
- OSS mode (no tenantId on job) → tenant check skipped

FlowStateManager tenant tests (manager.tenant.spec.ts):
- completeFlow finds flow created under same tenant context
- completeFlow does NOT find flow under different tenant context
- Unscoped flows are separate from tenant-scoped flows

Documentation:
- JSDoc on getFlowKey documenting ALS context consistency requirement
- Comment on streamAudio.js scopedCacheKey capture site

* fix: SSE stream tests hang on success path, remove internal fork references

The success-path tests entered the SSE streaming code which never
closes, causing timeout. Mock subscribe() to end the response
immediately. Restructured assertions to verify non-403/non-404.

Removed "private fork" and "OSS" references from code and test
descriptions — replaced with "deployment layer", "multi-tenant
deployments", and "single-tenant mode".

* fix: address review findings — test rigor, tenant ID validation, docs

F1: SSE stream tests now mock subscribe() with correct signature
(streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError) and assert 200 status,
verifying the tenant guard actually allows through same-tenant users.

F2: completeFlow logs the attempted key and ALS tenantId when flow
is not found, so reverse proxy misconfiguration (missing X-Tenant-Id
on OAuth callback) produces an actionable warning.

F3/F10: preAuthTenantMiddleware validates tenant ID format — rejects
colons, special characters, and values exceeding 128 chars. Trims
whitespace. Prevents cache key collisions via crafted headers.

F4: Documented cache invalidation scope limitation in
clearEndpointConfigCache — only the calling tenant's key is cleared;
other tenants expire via TTL.

F7: getFlowKey JSDoc now lists all 8 methods requiring consistent
ALS context.

F8: Added dedicated scopedCacheKey unit tests — base key without
context, base key in system context, scoped key with tenant, no
ALS leakage across scope boundaries.

* fix: revert flow key tenant scoping, fix SSE test timing

FlowStateManager: Reverts tenant-scoped flow keys. OAuth callbacks
arrive without tenant ALS context (provider redirects don't carry
X-Tenant-Id), so completeFlow/failFlow would never find flows
created under tenant context. Flow IDs are random UUIDs with no
collision risk, and flow data is ephemeral (TTL-bounded).

SSE tests: Use process.nextTick for onDone callback so Express
response headers are flushed before res.write/res.end are called.

* fix: restore getTenantId import for completeFlow diagnostic log

* fix: correct completeFlow warning message, add missing flow test

The warning referenced X-Tenant-Id header consistency which was only
relevant when flow keys were tenant-scoped (since reverted). Updated
to list actual causes: TTL expiry, missing flow, or routing to a
different instance without shared Keyv storage.

Removed the getTenantId() call and import — no longer needed since
flow keys are unscoped.

Added test for the !flowState branch in completeFlow — verifies
return false and logger.warn on nonexistent flow ID.

* fix: add explicit return type to recursive updateInterfacePermissions

The recursive call (tenantId branch calls itself without tenantId)
causes TypeScript to infer circular return type 'any'. Adding
explicit Promise<void> satisfies the rollup typescript plugin.

* fix: update MCPOAuthRaceCondition test to match new completeFlow warning

* fix: clearEndpointConfigCache deletes both scoped and unscoped keys

Unauthenticated /api/endpoints requests populate the unscoped
ENDPOINT_CONFIG key. Admin config mutations clear only the
tenant-scoped key, leaving the unscoped entry stale indefinitely.
Now deletes both when in tenant context.

* fix: tenant guard on abort/status endpoints, warn logs, test coverage

F1: Add tenant guard to /chat/status/:conversationId and /chat/abort
matching the existing guard on /chat/stream/:streamId. The status
endpoint exposes aggregatedContent (AI response text) which requires
tenant-level access control.

F2: preAuthTenantMiddleware now logs warn for rejected __SYSTEM__
sentinel and malformed tenant IDs, providing observability for
bypass probing attempts.

F3: Abort fallback path (getActiveJobIdsForUser) now has tenant
check after resolving the job.

F4: Test for strict mode + SYSTEM_TENANT_ID — verifies runAsSystem
bypasses tenantSafeBulkWrite without throwing in strict mode.

F5: Test for job with tenantId + user without tenantId → 403.

F10: Regex uses idiomatic hyphen-at-start form.

F11: Test descriptions changed from "rejects" to "ignores" since
middleware calls next() (not 4xx).

Also fixes MCPOAuthRaceCondition test assertion to match updated
completeFlow warning message.

* fix: test coverage for logger.warn, status/abort guards, consistency

A: preAuthTenant spec now mocks logger and asserts warn calls for
__SYSTEM__ sentinel, malformed characters, and oversized headers.

B: streamTenant spec expanded with status and abort endpoint tests —
cross-tenant status returns 403, same-tenant returns 200 with body,
cross-tenant abort returns 403.

C: Abort endpoint uses req.user.tenantId (not req.user?.tenantId)
matching stream/status pattern — requireJwtAuth guarantees req.user.

D: Malformed header warning now includes ip in log metadata,
matching the sentinel warning for consistent SOC correlation.

* fix: assert ip field in malformed header warn tests

* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order

- clearEndpointConfigCache uses Promise.all for independent cache
  deletes instead of sequential awaits
- SSE stream tenant guard has inline comment explaining backward-compat
  behavior for untenanted legacy jobs
- conversation.ts local imports reordered longest-to-shortest per
  AGENTS.md

* fix: tenant-qualify userJobs keys, document tenant guard backward-compat

Job store userJobs keys now include tenantId when available:
- Redis: stream:user:{tenantId:userId}:jobs (falls back to
  stream:user:{userId}:jobs when no tenant)
- InMemory: composite key tenantId:userId in userJobMap

getActiveJobIdsByUser/getActiveJobIdsForUser accept optional tenantId
parameter, threaded through from req.user.tenantId at all call sites
(/chat/active and /chat/abort fallback).

Added inline comments on all three SSE tenant guards explaining the
backward-compat design: untenanted legacy jobs remain accessible
when the userId check passes.

* fix: parallelize cache deletes, document tenant guard, fix import order

Fix InMemoryJobStore.getActiveJobIdsByUser empty-set cleanup to use
the tenant-qualified userKey instead of bare userId — prevents
orphaned empty Sets accumulating in userJobMap for multi-tenant users.

Document cross-tenant staleness in clearEndpointConfigCache JSDoc —
other tenants' scoped keys expire via TTL, not active invalidation.

* fix: cleanup userJobMap leak, startup warning, DRY tenant guard, docs

F1: InMemoryJobStore.cleanup() now removes entries from userJobMap
before calling deleteJob, preventing orphaned empty Sets from
accumulating with tenant-qualified composite keys.

F2: Startup warning when TENANT_ISOLATION_STRICT is active — reminds
operators to configure reverse proxy to control X-Tenant-Id header.

F3: mergeAppTools JSDoc documents that tenant-scoped TOOLS keys are
not actively invalidated (matching clearEndpointConfigCache pattern).

F5: Abort handler getActiveJobIdsForUser call uses req.user.tenantId
(not req.user?.tenantId) — consistent with stream/status handlers.

F6: updateInterfacePermissions JSDoc clarifies SYSTEM_TENANT_ID
behavior — falls through to caller's ALS context.

F7: Extracted hasTenantMismatch() helper, replacing three identical
inline tenant guard blocks across stream/status/abort endpoints.

F9: scopedCacheKey JSDoc documents both passthrough cases (no context
and SYSTEM_TENANT_ID context).

* fix: clean userJobMap in evictOldest — same leak as cleanup()
2026-03-28 16:43:50 -04:00

325 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript

const express = require('express');
const { isEnabled, GenerationJobManager } = require('@librechat/api');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const {
uaParser,
checkBan,
requireJwtAuth,
messageIpLimiter,
configMiddleware,
messageUserLimiter,
} = require('~/server/middleware');
const { saveMessage } = require('~/models');
const responses = require('./responses');
const openai = require('./openai');
const { v1 } = require('./v1');
const chat = require('./chat');
const { LIMIT_MESSAGE_IP, LIMIT_MESSAGE_USER } = process.env ?? {};
/** Untenanted jobs (pre-multi-tenancy) remain accessible if the userId check passes. */
function hasTenantMismatch(job, user) {
return job.metadata?.tenantId != null && job.metadata.tenantId !== user.tenantId;
}
const router = express.Router();
/**
* Open Responses API routes (API key authentication handled in route file)
* Mounted at /agents/v1/responses (full path: /api/agents/v1/responses)
* NOTE: Must be mounted BEFORE /v1 to avoid being caught by the less specific route
* @see https://openresponses.org/specification
*/
router.use('/v1/responses', responses);
/**
* OpenAI-compatible API routes (API key authentication handled in route file)
* Mounted at /agents/v1 (full path: /api/agents/v1/chat/completions)
*/
router.use('/v1', openai);
router.use(requireJwtAuth);
router.use(checkBan);
router.use(uaParser);
router.use('/', v1);
/**
* Stream endpoints - mounted before chatRouter to bypass rate limiters
* These are GET requests and don't need message body validation or rate limiting
*/
/**
* @route GET /chat/stream/:streamId
* @desc Subscribe to an ongoing generation job's SSE stream with replay support
* @access Private
* @description Sends sync event with resume state, replays missed chunks, then streams live
* @query resume=true - Indicates this is a reconnection (sends sync event)
*/
router.get('/chat/stream/:streamId', async (req, res) => {
const { streamId } = req.params;
const isResume = req.query.resume === 'true';
const job = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(streamId);
if (!job) {
return res.status(404).json({
error: 'Stream not found',
message: 'The generation job does not exist or has expired.',
});
}
if (job.metadata?.userId && job.metadata.userId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
if (hasTenantMismatch(job, req.user)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
res.setHeader('Content-Encoding', 'identity');
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/event-stream');
res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-cache, no-transform');
res.setHeader('Connection', 'keep-alive');
res.setHeader('X-Accel-Buffering', 'no');
res.flushHeaders();
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Client subscribed to ${streamId}, resume: ${isResume}`);
const writeEvent = (event) => {
if (!res.writableEnded) {
res.write(`event: message\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(event)}\n\n`);
if (typeof res.flush === 'function') {
res.flush();
}
}
};
const onDone = (event) => {
writeEvent(event);
res.end();
};
const onError = (error) => {
if (!res.writableEnded) {
res.write(`event: error\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ error })}\n\n`);
if (typeof res.flush === 'function') {
res.flush();
}
res.end();
}
};
let result;
if (isResume) {
const { subscription, resumeState, pendingEvents } =
await GenerationJobManager.subscribeWithResume(streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError);
if (!res.writableEnded) {
if (resumeState) {
res.write(
`event: message\ndata: ${JSON.stringify({ sync: true, resumeState, pendingEvents })}\n\n`,
);
if (typeof res.flush === 'function') {
res.flush();
}
GenerationJobManager.markSyncSent(streamId);
logger.debug(
`[AgentStream] Sent sync event for ${streamId} with ${resumeState.runSteps.length} run steps, ${pendingEvents.length} pending events`,
);
} else if (pendingEvents.length > 0) {
for (const event of pendingEvents) {
writeEvent(event);
}
logger.warn(
`[AgentStream] Resume state null for ${streamId}, replayed ${pendingEvents.length} gap events directly`,
);
}
}
result = subscription;
} else {
result = await GenerationJobManager.subscribe(streamId, writeEvent, onDone, onError);
}
if (!result) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Failed to subscribe to stream' });
}
req.on('close', () => {
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Client disconnected from ${streamId}`);
result.unsubscribe();
});
});
/**
* @route GET /chat/active
* @desc Get all active generation job IDs for the current user
* @access Private
* @returns { activeJobIds: string[] }
*/
router.get('/chat/active', async (req, res) => {
const activeJobIds = await GenerationJobManager.getActiveJobIdsForUser(
req.user.id,
req.user.tenantId,
);
res.json({ activeJobIds });
});
/**
* @route GET /chat/status/:conversationId
* @desc Check if there's an active generation job for a conversation
* @access Private
* @returns { active, streamId, status, aggregatedContent, createdAt, resumeState }
*/
router.get('/chat/status/:conversationId', async (req, res) => {
const { conversationId } = req.params;
// streamId === conversationId, so we can use getJob directly
const job = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(conversationId);
if (!job) {
return res.json({ active: false });
}
if (job.metadata.userId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
if (hasTenantMismatch(job, req.user)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
// Get resume state which contains aggregatedContent
// Avoid calling both getStreamInfo and getResumeState (both fetch content)
const resumeState = await GenerationJobManager.getResumeState(conversationId);
const isActive = job.status === 'running';
res.json({
active: isActive,
streamId: conversationId,
status: job.status,
aggregatedContent: resumeState?.aggregatedContent ?? [],
createdAt: job.createdAt,
resumeState,
});
});
/**
* @route POST /chat/abort
* @desc Abort an ongoing generation job
* @access Private
* @description Mounted before chatRouter to bypass buildEndpointOption middleware
*/
router.post('/chat/abort', async (req, res) => {
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] ========== ABORT ENDPOINT HIT ==========`);
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Method: ${req.method}, Path: ${req.path}`);
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Body:`, req.body);
const { streamId, conversationId, abortKey } = req.body;
const userId = req.user?.id;
// streamId === conversationId, so try any of the provided IDs
// Skip "new" as it's a placeholder for new conversations, not an actual ID
let jobStreamId =
streamId || (conversationId !== 'new' ? conversationId : null) || abortKey?.split(':')[0];
let job = jobStreamId ? await GenerationJobManager.getJob(jobStreamId) : null;
// Fallback: if job not found and we have a userId, look up active jobs for user
// This handles the case where frontend sends "new" but job was created with a UUID
if (!job && userId) {
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Job not found by ID, checking active jobs for user: ${userId}`);
const activeJobIds = await GenerationJobManager.getActiveJobIdsForUser(
userId,
req.user.tenantId,
);
if (activeJobIds.length > 0) {
// Abort the most recent active job for this user
jobStreamId = activeJobIds[0];
job = await GenerationJobManager.getJob(jobStreamId);
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Found active job for user: ${jobStreamId}`);
}
}
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Computed jobStreamId: ${jobStreamId}`);
if (job && jobStreamId) {
if (job.metadata?.userId && job.metadata.userId !== userId) {
logger.warn(`[AgentStream] Unauthorized abort attempt for ${jobStreamId} by user ${userId}`);
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
if (hasTenantMismatch(job, req.user)) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Job found, aborting: ${jobStreamId}`);
const abortResult = await GenerationJobManager.abortJob(jobStreamId);
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Job aborted successfully: ${jobStreamId}`, {
abortResultSuccess: abortResult.success,
abortResultUserMessageId: abortResult.jobData?.userMessage?.messageId,
abortResultResponseMessageId: abortResult.jobData?.responseMessageId,
});
// CRITICAL: Save partial response BEFORE returning to prevent race condition.
// If user sends a follow-up immediately after abort, the parentMessageId must exist in DB.
// Only save if we have a valid responseMessageId (skip early aborts before generation started)
if (
abortResult.success &&
abortResult.jobData?.userMessage?.messageId &&
abortResult.jobData?.responseMessageId
) {
const { jobData, content, text } = abortResult;
const responseMessage = {
messageId: jobData.responseMessageId,
parentMessageId: jobData.userMessage.messageId,
conversationId: jobData.conversationId,
content: content || [],
text: text || '',
sender: jobData.sender || 'AI',
endpoint: jobData.endpoint,
model: jobData.model,
unfinished: true,
error: false,
isCreatedByUser: false,
user: userId,
};
try {
await saveMessage(
{
userId: req?.user?.id,
isTemporary: req?.body?.isTemporary,
interfaceConfig: req?.config?.interfaceConfig,
},
responseMessage,
{ context: 'api/server/routes/agents/index.js - abort endpoint' },
);
logger.debug(`[AgentStream] Saved partial response for: ${jobStreamId}`);
} catch (saveError) {
logger.error(`[AgentStream] Failed to save partial response: ${saveError.message}`);
}
}
return res.json({ success: true, aborted: jobStreamId });
}
logger.warn(`[AgentStream] Job not found for streamId: ${jobStreamId}`);
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Job not found', streamId: jobStreamId });
});
const chatRouter = express.Router();
chatRouter.use(configMiddleware);
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_IP)) {
chatRouter.use(messageIpLimiter);
}
if (isEnabled(LIMIT_MESSAGE_USER)) {
chatRouter.use(messageUserLimiter);
}
chatRouter.use('/', chat);
router.use('/chat', chatRouter);
module.exports = router;