🪪 fix: MCP API Responses and OAuth Validation (#12217)

* 🔒 fix: Validate MCP Configs in Server Responses

* 🔒 fix: Enhance OAuth URL Validation in MCPOAuthHandler

- Introduced validation for OAuth URLs to ensure they do not target private or internal addresses, enhancing security against SSRF attacks.
- Updated the OAuth flow to validate both authorization and token URLs before use, ensuring compliance with security standards.
- Refactored redirect URI handling to streamline the OAuth client registration process.
- Added comprehensive error handling for invalid URLs, improving robustness in OAuth interactions.

* 🔒 feat: Implement Permission Checks for MCP Server Management

- Added permission checkers for MCP server usage and creation, enhancing access control.
- Updated routes for reinitializing MCP servers and retrieving authentication values to include these permission checks, ensuring only authorized users can access these functionalities.
- Refactored existing permission logic to improve clarity and maintainability.

* 🔒 fix: Enhance MCP Server Response Validation and Redaction

- Updated MCP route tests to use `toMatchObject` for better validation of server response structures, ensuring consistency in expected properties.
- Refactored the `redactServerSecrets` function to streamline the removal of sensitive information, ensuring that user-sourced API keys are properly redacted while retaining their source.
- Improved OAuth security tests to validate rejection of private URLs across multiple endpoints, enhancing protection against SSRF vulnerabilities.
- Added comprehensive tests for the `redactServerSecrets` function to ensure proper handling of various server configurations, reinforcing security measures.

* chore: eslint

* 🔒 fix: Enhance OAuth Server URL Validation in MCPOAuthHandler

- Added validation for discovered authorization server URLs to ensure they meet security standards.
- Improved logging to provide clearer insights when an authorization server is found from resource metadata.
- Refactored the handling of authorization server URLs to enhance robustness against potential security vulnerabilities.

* 🔒 test: Bypass SSRF validation for MCP OAuth Flow tests

- Mocked SSRF validation functions to allow tests to use real local HTTP servers, facilitating more accurate testing of the MCP OAuth flow.
- Updated test setup to ensure compatibility with the new mocking strategy, enhancing the reliability of the tests.

* 🔒 fix: Add Validation for OAuth Metadata Endpoints in MCPOAuthHandler

- Implemented checks for the presence and validity of registration and token endpoints in the OAuth metadata, enhancing security by ensuring that these URLs are properly validated before use.
- Improved error handling and logging to provide better insights during the OAuth metadata processing, reinforcing the robustness of the OAuth flow.

* 🔒 refactor: Simplify MCP Auth Values Endpoint Logic

- Removed redundant permission checks for accessing the MCP server resource in the auth-values endpoint, streamlining the request handling process.
- Consolidated error handling and response structure for improved clarity and maintainability.
- Enhanced logging for better insights during the authentication value checks, reinforcing the robustness of the endpoint.

* 🔒 test: Refactor LeaderElection Integration Tests for Improved Cleanup

- Moved Redis key cleanup to the beforeEach hook to ensure a clean state before each test.
- Enhanced afterEach logic to handle instance resignations and Redis key deletion more robustly, improving test reliability and maintainability.
This commit is contained in:
Danny Avila 2026-03-13 23:18:56 -04:00 committed by GitHub
parent f32907cd36
commit fa9e1b228a
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
10 changed files with 845 additions and 102 deletions

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@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import {
selectRegistrationAuthMethod,
inferClientAuthMethod,
} from './methods';
import { isSSRFTarget, resolveHostnameSSRF } from '~/auth';
import { sanitizeUrlForLogging } from '~/mcp/utils';
/** Type for the OAuth metadata from the SDK */
@ -144,7 +145,9 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
resourceMetadata = await discoverOAuthProtectedResourceMetadata(serverUrl, {}, fetchFn);
if (resourceMetadata?.authorization_servers?.length) {
authServerUrl = new URL(resourceMetadata.authorization_servers[0]);
const discoveredAuthServer = resourceMetadata.authorization_servers[0];
await this.validateOAuthUrl(discoveredAuthServer, 'authorization_server');
authServerUrl = new URL(discoveredAuthServer);
logger.debug(
`[MCPOAuth] Found authorization server from resource metadata: ${authServerUrl}`,
);
@ -200,6 +203,19 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] OAuth metadata discovered successfully`);
const metadata = await OAuthMetadataSchema.parseAsync(rawMetadata);
const endpointChecks: Promise<void>[] = [];
if (metadata.registration_endpoint) {
endpointChecks.push(
this.validateOAuthUrl(metadata.registration_endpoint, 'registration_endpoint'),
);
}
if (metadata.token_endpoint) {
endpointChecks.push(this.validateOAuthUrl(metadata.token_endpoint, 'token_endpoint'));
}
if (endpointChecks.length > 0) {
await Promise.all(endpointChecks);
}
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] OAuth metadata parsed successfully`);
return {
metadata: metadata as unknown as OAuthMetadata,
@ -355,10 +371,14 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] Generated flowId: ${flowId}, state: ${state}`);
try {
// Check if we have pre-configured OAuth settings
if (config?.authorization_url && config?.token_url && config?.client_id) {
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] Using pre-configured OAuth settings for ${serverName}`);
await Promise.all([
this.validateOAuthUrl(config.authorization_url, 'authorization_url'),
this.validateOAuthUrl(config.token_url, 'token_url'),
]);
const skipCodeChallengeCheck =
config?.skip_code_challenge_check === true ||
process.env.MCP_SKIP_CODE_CHALLENGE_CHECK === 'true';
@ -410,10 +430,11 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
code_challenge_methods_supported: codeChallengeMethodsSupported,
};
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] metadata for "${serverName}": ${JSON.stringify(metadata)}`);
const redirectUri = this.getDefaultRedirectUri(serverName);
const clientInfo: OAuthClientInformation = {
client_id: config.client_id,
client_secret: config.client_secret,
redirect_uris: [config.redirect_uri || this.getDefaultRedirectUri(serverName)],
redirect_uris: [redirectUri],
scope: config.scope,
token_endpoint_auth_method: tokenEndpointAuthMethod,
};
@ -422,7 +443,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
const { authorizationUrl, codeVerifier } = await startAuthorization(serverUrl, {
metadata: metadata as unknown as SDKOAuthMetadata,
clientInformation: clientInfo,
redirectUrl: clientInfo.redirect_uris?.[0] || this.getDefaultRedirectUri(serverName),
redirectUrl: redirectUri,
scope: config.scope,
});
@ -462,8 +483,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
`[MCPOAuth] OAuth metadata discovered, auth server URL: ${sanitizeUrlForLogging(authServerUrl)}`,
);
/** Dynamic client registration based on the discovered metadata */
const redirectUri = config?.redirect_uri || this.getDefaultRedirectUri(serverName);
const redirectUri = this.getDefaultRedirectUri(serverName);
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] Registering OAuth client with redirect URI: ${redirectUri}`);
const clientInfo = await this.registerOAuthClient(
@ -672,6 +692,24 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
return randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
}
/** Validates an OAuth URL is not targeting a private/internal address */
private static async validateOAuthUrl(url: string, fieldName: string): Promise<void> {
let hostname: string;
try {
hostname = new URL(url).hostname;
} catch {
throw new Error(`Invalid OAuth ${fieldName}: ${sanitizeUrlForLogging(url)}`);
}
if (isSSRFTarget(hostname)) {
throw new Error(`OAuth ${fieldName} targets a blocked address`);
}
if (await resolveHostnameSSRF(hostname)) {
throw new Error(`OAuth ${fieldName} resolves to a private IP address`);
}
}
private static readonly STATE_MAP_TYPE = 'mcp_oauth_state';
/**
@ -783,10 +821,10 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
scope: metadata.clientInfo.scope,
});
/** Use the stored client information and metadata to determine the token URL */
let tokenUrl: string;
let authMethods: string[] | undefined;
if (config?.token_url) {
await this.validateOAuthUrl(config.token_url, 'token_url');
tokenUrl = config.token_url;
authMethods = config.token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported;
} else if (!metadata.serverUrl) {
@ -813,6 +851,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
tokenUrl = oauthMetadata.token_endpoint;
authMethods = oauthMetadata.token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported;
}
await this.validateOAuthUrl(tokenUrl, 'token_url');
}
const body = new URLSearchParams({
@ -886,10 +925,10 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
return this.processRefreshResponse(tokens, metadata.serverName, 'stored client info');
}
// Fallback: If we have pre-configured OAuth settings, use them
if (config?.token_url && config?.client_id) {
logger.debug(`[MCPOAuth] Using pre-configured OAuth settings for token refresh`);
await this.validateOAuthUrl(config.token_url, 'token_url');
const tokenUrl = new URL(config.token_url);
const body = new URLSearchParams({
@ -987,6 +1026,7 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
} else {
tokenUrl = new URL(oauthMetadata.token_endpoint);
}
await this.validateOAuthUrl(tokenUrl.href, 'token_url');
const body = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'refresh_token',
@ -1036,7 +1076,9 @@ export class MCPOAuthHandler {
},
oauthHeaders: Record<string, string> = {},
): Promise<void> {
// build the revoke URL, falling back to the server URL + /revoke if no revocation endpoint is provided
if (metadata.revocationEndpoint != null) {
await this.validateOAuthUrl(metadata.revocationEndpoint, 'revocation_endpoint');
}
const revokeUrl: URL =
metadata.revocationEndpoint != null
? new URL(metadata.revocationEndpoint)