🔒 fix: Hex-normalized IPv4-mapped IPv6 in Domain Validation (#12130)

* 🔒 fix: handle hex-normalized IPv4-mapped IPv6 in domain validation * fix: Enhance IPv6 private address detection in domain validation - Added tests for detecting IPv4-compatible, 6to4, NAT64, and Teredo addresses. - Implemented `extractEmbeddedIPv4` function to identify private IPv4 addresses within various IPv6 formats. - Updated `isPrivateIP` function to utilize the new extraction logic for improved accuracy in address validation. * fix: Update private IPv4 detection logic in domain validation - Enhanced the `isPrivateIPv4` function to accurately identify additional private and non-routable IPv4 ranges. - Adjusted the return logic in `resolveHostnameSSRF` to utilize the updated private IP detection for improved hostname validation. * test: Expand private IP detection tests in domain validation - Added tests for additional private IPv4 ranges including 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.0.0/24, and 198.18.0.0/15. - Updated existing tests to ensure accurate detection of private and multicast IP addresses in the `isPrivateIP` function. - Enhanced `resolveHostnameSSRF` to correctly identify private literal IPv4 addresses without DNS lookup. * refactor: Rename and enhance embedded IPv4 detection in IPv6 addresses - Renamed `extractEmbeddedIPv4` to `hasPrivateEmbeddedIPv4` for clarity on its purpose. - Updated logic to accurately check for private IPv4 addresses embedded in Teredo, 6to4, and NAT64 IPv6 formats. - Improved the `isPrivateIP` function to utilize the new naming and logic for better readability and accuracy. - Enhanced documentation for clarity on the functionality of the updated methods. * feat: Enhance private IPv4 detection in embedded IPv6 addresses - Added additional checks in `hasPrivateEmbeddedIPv4` to ensure only valid private IPv4 formats are recognized. - Improved the logic for identifying private IPv4 addresses embedded within various IPv6 formats, enhancing overall accuracy. * test: Add additional test for hostname resolution in SSRF detection - Included a new test case in `resolveHostnameSSRF` to validate the detection of private IPv4 addresses embedded in IPv6 formats for the hostname 'meta.example.com'. - Enhanced existing tests to ensure comprehensive coverage of hostname resolution scenarios. * fix: Set redirect option to 'manual' in undiciFetch calls - Updated undiciFetch calls in MCPConnection to include the redirect option set to 'manual' for better control over HTTP redirects. - Added documentation comments regarding SSRF pre-checks for WebSocket connections, highlighting the limitations of the current SDK regarding DNS resolution. * test: Add integration tests for MCP SSRF protections - Introduced a new test suite for MCP SSRF protections, verifying that MCPConnection does not follow HTTP redirects to private IPs and blocks WebSocket connections to private IPs when SSRF protection is enabled. - Implemented tests to ensure correct behavior of the connection under various scenarios, including redirect handling and WebSocket DNS resolution. * refactor: Improve SSRF protection logic for WebSocket connections - Enhanced the SSRF pre-check for WebSocket connections to validate resolved IPs, ensuring that allowlisting a domain does not grant trust to its resolved IPs at runtime. - Updated documentation comments to clarify the limitations of the current SDK regarding DNS resolution and the implications for SSRF protection. * test: Enhance MCP SSRF protection tests for redirect handling and WebSocket connections - Updated tests to ensure that MCPConnection does not follow HTTP redirects to private IPs, regardless of SSRF protection settings. - Added checks to verify that WebSocket connections to hosts resolving to private IPs are blocked, even when SSRF protection is disabled. - Improved documentation comments for clarity on the behavior of the tests and the implications for SSRF protection. * test: Refactor MCP SSRF protection test for WebSocket connection errors - Updated the test to use `await expect(...).rejects.not.toThrow(...)` for better readability and clarity. - Simplified the error handling logic while ensuring that SSRF rejections are correctly validated during connection failures.
2026-03-09 09:32:36 +01:00 · 2026-03-07 20:13:52 -05:00 · 2026-03-07 20:13:52 -05:00 · 4a8a5b5994
commit 4a8a5b5994
parent 2ac62a2e71
4 changed files with 627 additions and 33 deletions
--- a/packages/api/src/auth/domain.spec.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/auth/domain.spec.ts
@ -153,8 +153,9 @@ describe('isSSRFTarget', () => {
      expect(isSSRFTarget('169.254.0.1')).toBe(true);
    });

-    it('should block 0.0.0.0', () => {
+    it('should block 0.0.0.0/8 (current network)', () => {
      expect(isSSRFTarget('0.0.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isSSRFTarget('0.1.2.3')).toBe(true);
    });

    it('should allow public IPs', () => {
@ -230,8 +231,36 @@ describe('isPrivateIP', () => {
      expect(isPrivateIP('169.254.0.1')).toBe(true);
    });

-    it('should detect 0.0.0.0', () => {
+    it('should detect 0.0.0.0/8 (current network)', () => {
      expect(isPrivateIP('0.0.0.0')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('0.1.2.3')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should detect 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT / shared address space)', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIP('100.64.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('100.127.255.255')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('100.63.255.255')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('100.128.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should detect 192.0.0.0/24 (IETF protocol assignments)', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIP('192.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('192.0.0.255')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('192.0.1.1')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should detect 198.18.0.0/15 (benchmarking)', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIP('198.18.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('198.19.255.255')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('198.17.0.1')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('198.20.0.1')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should detect 224.0.0.0/4 (multicast) and 240.0.0.0/4 (reserved)', () => {
+      expect(isPrivateIP('224.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('239.255.255.255')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('240.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isPrivateIP('255.255.255.255')).toBe(true);
    });

    it('should allow public IPs', () => {
@ -270,6 +299,144 @@ describe('isPrivateIP', () => {
  });
 });

+describe('isPrivateIP - IPv4-mapped IPv6 hex-normalized form (CVE-style SSRF bypass)', () => {
+  /**
+   * Node.js URL parser normalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 from dotted-decimal to hex:
+   *   new URL('http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/').hostname → '::ffff:a9fe:a9fe'
+   *
+   * These tests confirm whether isPrivateIP catches the hex form that actually
+   * reaches it in production (via parseDomainSpec → new URL → hostname).
+   */
+  it('should detect hex-normalized AWS metadata address (::ffff:a9fe:a9fe)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:169.254.169.254 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:a9fe:a9fe')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized loopback (::ffff:7f00:1)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:127.0.0.1 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:7f00:1')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized 192.168.x.x (::ffff:c0a8:101)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:192.168.1.1 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:c0a8:101')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized 10.x.x.x (::ffff:a00:1)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:10.0.0.1 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:a00:1')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized 172.16.x.x (::ffff:ac10:1)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:172.16.0.1 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:ac10:1')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized 0.0.0.0 (::ffff:0:0)', () => {
+    // ::ffff:0.0.0.0 → hex form after URL parsing
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:0:0')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should allow hex-normalized public IPs (::ffff:808:808 = 8.8.8.8)', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::ffff:808:808')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect IPv4-compatible addresses without ffff prefix (::XXXX:XXXX)', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::7f00:1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::a9fe:a9fe')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::c0a8:101')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::a00:1')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should allow public IPs in IPv4-compatible form', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('::808:808')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect 6to4 addresses embedding private IPv4 (2002:XXXX:XXXX::)', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2002:7f00:1::')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2002:a9fe:a9fe::')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2002:c0a8:101::')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2002:a00:1::')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should allow 6to4 addresses embedding public IPv4', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2002:808:808::')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect NAT64 addresses embedding private IPv4 (64:ff9b::XXXX:XXXX)', () => {
+    expect(isPrivateIP('64:ff9b::7f00:1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isPrivateIP('64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should detect Teredo addresses with complement-encoded private IPv4 (RFC 4380)', () => {
+    // Teredo stores external IPv4 as bitwise complement in last 32 bits
+    // 127.0.0.1 → complement: 0x80ff:0xfffe
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2001::80ff:fffe')).toBe(true);
+    // 169.254.169.254 → complement: 0x5601:0x5601
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2001::5601:5601')).toBe(true);
+    // 10.0.0.1 → complement: 0xf5ff:0xfffe
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2001::f5ff:fffe')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should allow Teredo addresses with complement-encoded public IPv4', () => {
+    // 8.8.8.8 → complement: 0xf7f7:0xf7f7
+    expect(isPrivateIP('2001::f7f7:f7f7')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should confirm URL parser produces the hex form that bypasses dotted regex', () => {
+    // This test documents the exact normalization gap
+    const hostname = new URL('http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/').hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
+    expect(hostname).toBe('::ffff:a9fe:a9fe'); // hex, not dotted
+    // The hostname that actually reaches isPrivateIP must be caught
+    expect(isPrivateIP(hostname)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isActionDomainAllowed - IPv4-mapped IPv6 hex SSRF bypass (end-to-end)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    mockedLookup.mockResolvedValue([{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }] as never);
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('should block http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/ (AWS metadata via IPv6)', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should block http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/ (loopback via IPv6)', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should block http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]/ (private via IPv6)', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should block http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/ (private via IPv6)', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should allow http://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/ (public via IPv6)', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/', null)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('should block IPv4-compatible IPv6 without ffff prefix', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::127.0.0.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[::169.254.169.254]/', null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:127.0.0.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should block 6to4 addresses embedding private IPv4', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[2002:7f00:1::]/', null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should block NAT64 addresses embedding private IPv4', async () => {
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[64:ff9b::127.0.0.1]/', null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(await isActionDomainAllowed('http://[64:ff9b::169.254.169.254]/', null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
 describe('resolveHostnameSSRF', () => {
  afterEach(() => {
    jest.clearAllMocks();
@ -298,16 +465,50 @@ describe('resolveHostnameSSRF', () => {
    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('example.com')).toBe(false);
  });

-  it('should skip literal IPv4 addresses (handled by isSSRFTarget)', async () => {
-    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('169.254.169.254')).toBe(false);
+  it('should detect private literal IPv4 addresses without DNS lookup', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('169.254.169.254')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('127.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('10.0.0.1')).toBe(true);
    expect(mockedLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
  });

-  it('should skip literal IPv6 addresses', async () => {
-    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('::1')).toBe(false);
+  it('should allow public literal IPv4 addresses without DNS lookup', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('8.8.8.8')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('93.184.216.34')).toBe(false);
    expect(mockedLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
  });

+  it('should detect private IPv6 literals without DNS lookup', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('::1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('fc00::1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('fe80::1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockedLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('should detect hex-normalized IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('::ffff:a9fe:a9fe')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('::ffff:7f00:1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]')).toBe(true);
+    expect(mockedLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('should allow public IPv6 literals without DNS lookup', async () => {
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('2001:db8::1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('::ffff:808:808')).toBe(false);
+    expect(mockedLookup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('should detect private IPv6 addresses returned from DNS lookup', async () => {
+    mockedLookup.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ address: '::1', family: 6 }] as never);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('ipv6-loopback.example.com')).toBe(true);
+
+    mockedLookup.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ address: 'fc00::1', family: 6 }] as never);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('ula.example.com')).toBe(true);
+
+    mockedLookup.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ address: '::ffff:a9fe:a9fe', family: 6 }] as never);
+    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('meta.example.com')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
  it('should fail open on DNS resolution failure', async () => {
    mockedLookup.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('ENOTFOUND'));
    expect(await resolveHostnameSSRF('nonexistent.example.com')).toBe(false);
@ -915,4 +1116,44 @@ describe('isMCPDomainAllowed', () => {
      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'wss://example.com' }, ['example.com'])).toBe(true);
    });
  });
+
+  describe('IPv4-mapped IPv6 hex SSRF bypass', () => {
+    it('should block MCP server targeting AWS metadata via IPv6-mapped address', async () => {
+      const config = { url: 'http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/mcp' };
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed(config, null)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should block MCP server targeting loopback via IPv6-mapped address', async () => {
+      const config = { url: 'http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/mcp' };
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed(config, null)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should block MCP server targeting private range via IPv6-mapped address', async () => {
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(
+        false,
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('should block WebSocket MCP targeting private range via IPv6-mapped address', async () => {
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'ws://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'wss://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should allow MCP server targeting public IP via IPv6-mapped address', async () => {
+      const config = { url: 'http://[::ffff:8.8.8.8]/mcp' };
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed(config, null)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('should block MCP server targeting 6to4 embedded private IPv4', async () => {
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'http://[2002:7f00:1::]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'ws://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('should block MCP server targeting NAT64 embedded private IPv4', async () => {
+      expect(await isMCPDomainAllowed({ url: 'http://[64:ff9b::127.0.0.1]/mcp' }, null)).toBe(
+        false,
+      );
+    });
+  });
 });
--- a/packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/auth/domain.ts
@ -24,26 +24,79 @@ export function isEmailDomainAllowed(email: string, allowedDomains?: string[] |
  return allowedDomains.some((allowedDomain) => allowedDomain?.toLowerCase() === domain);
 }

-/** Checks if IPv4 octets fall within private, reserved, or link-local ranges */
+/** Checks if IPv4 octets fall within private, reserved, or non-routable ranges */
 function isPrivateIPv4(a: number, b: number, c: number): boolean {
-  if (a === 127) {
+  if (a === 0) {
    return true;
  }
  if (a === 10) {
    return true;
  }
+  if (a === 127) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (a === 169 && b === 254) {
+    return true;
+  }
  if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) {
    return true;
  }
  if (a === 192 && b === 168) {
    return true;
  }
-  if (a === 169 && b === 254) {
+  if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0) {
    return true;
  }
-  if (a === 0 && b === 0 && c === 0) {
+  if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) {
    return true;
  }
+  if (a >= 224) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/** Checks if an IPv6 address embeds a private IPv4 via 6to4, NAT64, or Teredo */
+function hasPrivateEmbeddedIPv4(ipv6: string): boolean {
+  if (!ipv6.startsWith('2002:') && !ipv6.startsWith('64:ff9b::') && !ipv6.startsWith('2001::')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const segments = ipv6.split(':').filter((s) => s !== '');
+
+  if (ipv6.startsWith('2002:') && segments.length >= 3) {
+    const hi = parseInt(segments[1], 16);
+    const lo = parseInt(segments[2], 16);
+    if (!isNaN(hi) && !isNaN(lo)) {
+      return isPrivateIPv4((hi >> 8) & 0xff, hi & 0xff, (lo >> 8) & 0xff);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ipv6.startsWith('64:ff9b::')) {
+    const lastTwo = segments.slice(-2);
+    if (lastTwo.length === 2) {
+      const hi = parseInt(lastTwo[0], 16);
+      const lo = parseInt(lastTwo[1], 16);
+      if (!isNaN(hi) && !isNaN(lo)) {
+        return isPrivateIPv4((hi >> 8) & 0xff, hi & 0xff, (lo >> 8) & 0xff);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // RFC 4380: Teredo stores external IPv4 as bitwise complement in last 32 bits
+  if (ipv6.startsWith('2001::')) {
+    const lastTwo = segments.slice(-2);
+    if (lastTwo.length === 2) {
+      const hi = parseInt(lastTwo[0], 16);
+      const lo = parseInt(lastTwo[1], 16);
+      if (!isNaN(hi) && !isNaN(lo)) {
+        return isPrivateIPv4((~hi >> 8) & 0xff, ~hi & 0xff, (~lo >> 8) & 0xff);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
  return false;
 }

@ -52,7 +105,10 @@ function isPrivateIPv4(a: number, b: number, c: number): boolean {
 * Handles IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:A.B.C.D).
 */
 export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
-  const normalized = ip.toLowerCase().trim();
+  const normalized = ip
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .trim()
+    .replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');

  const mappedMatch = normalized.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
  if (mappedMatch) {
@ -60,42 +116,52 @@ export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
    return isPrivateIPv4(a, b, c);
  }

+  const hexMappedMatch = normalized.match(/^(?:::ffff:|::)([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
+  if (hexMappedMatch) {
+    const hi = parseInt(hexMappedMatch[1], 16);
+    const lo = parseInt(hexMappedMatch[2], 16);
+    return isPrivateIPv4((hi >> 8) & 0xff, hi & 0xff, (lo >> 8) & 0xff);
+  }
+
  const ipv4Match = normalized.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
  if (ipv4Match) {
    const [, a, b, c] = ipv4Match.map(Number);
    return isPrivateIPv4(a, b, c);
  }

-  const ipv6 = normalized.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
  if (
-    ipv6 === '::1' ||
-    ipv6 === '::' ||
-    ipv6.startsWith('fc') ||
-    ipv6.startsWith('fd') ||
-    ipv6.startsWith('fe80')
+    normalized === '::1' ||
+    normalized === '::' ||
+    normalized.startsWith('fc') ||
+    normalized.startsWith('fd') ||
+    normalized.startsWith('fe80')
  ) {
    return true;
  }

+  if (hasPrivateEmbeddedIPv4(normalized)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
  return false;
 }

 /**
- * Resolves a hostname via DNS and checks if any resolved address is a private/reserved IP.
- * Detects DNS-based SSRF bypasses (e.g., nip.io wildcard DNS, attacker-controlled nameservers).
- * Fails open: returns false if DNS resolution fails, since hostname-only checks still apply
- * and the actual HTTP request would also fail.
+ * Checks if a hostname resolves to a private/reserved IP address.
+ * Directly validates literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses without DNS lookup.
+ * For hostnames, resolves via DNS and checks all returned addresses.
+ * Fails open on DNS errors (returns false), since the HTTP request would also fail.
 */
 export async function resolveHostnameSSRF(hostname: string): Promise<boolean> {
  const normalizedHost = hostname.toLowerCase().trim();

  if (/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/.test(normalizedHost)) {
-    return false;
+    return isPrivateIP(normalizedHost);
  }

  const ipv6Check = normalizedHost.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
  if (ipv6Check.includes(':')) {
-    return false;
+    return isPrivateIP(ipv6Check);
  }

  try {
--- a/packages/api/src/mcp/tests/MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/mcp/tests/MCPConnectionSSRF.test.ts
@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/**
+ * Integration tests for MCP SSRF protections.
+ *
+ * These tests spin up real in-process HTTP servers and verify that MCPConnection:
+ *
+ * 1. Does NOT follow HTTP redirects from SSE/StreamableHTTP transports
+ *    (redirect: 'manual' prevents SSRF via server-controlled 301/302)
+ * 2. Blocks WebSocket connections to hosts that DNS-resolve to private IPs,
+ *    regardless of whether useSSRFProtection is enabled (allowlist scenario)
+ */
+
+import * as net from 'net';
+import * as http from 'http';
+import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
+import { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
+import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';
+import type { Socket } from 'net';
+import { MCPConnection } from '~/mcp/connection';
+import { resolveHostnameSSRF } from '~/auth';
+
+jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
+  logger: {
+    info: jest.fn(),
+    warn: jest.fn(),
+    error: jest.fn(),
+    debug: jest.fn(),
+  },
+}));
+
+jest.mock('~/auth', () => ({
+  createSSRFSafeUndiciConnect: jest.fn(() => undefined),
+  resolveHostnameSSRF: jest.fn(async () => false),
+}));
+
+jest.mock('~/mcp/mcpConfig', () => ({
+  mcpConfig: { CONNECTION_CHECK_TTL: 0 },
+}));
+
+const mockedResolveHostnameSSRF = resolveHostnameSSRF as jest.MockedFunction<
+  typeof resolveHostnameSSRF
+>;
+
+async function safeDisconnect(conn: MCPConnection | null): Promise<void> {
+  if (!conn) {
+    return;
+  }
+  (conn as unknown as { shouldStopReconnecting: boolean }).shouldStopReconnecting = true;
+  conn.removeAllListeners();
+  await conn.disconnect();
+}
+
+interface TestServer {
+  url: string;
+  redirectHit: boolean;
+  close: () => Promise<void>;
+}
+
+function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const srv = net.createServer();
+    srv.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const addr = srv.address() as net.AddressInfo;
+      srv.close((err) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addr.port)));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function trackSockets(httpServer: http.Server): () => Promise<void> {
+  const sockets = new Set<Socket>();
+  httpServer.on('connection', (socket: Socket) => {
+    sockets.add(socket);
+    socket.once('close', () => sockets.delete(socket));
+  });
+  return () =>
+    new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      for (const socket of sockets) {
+        socket.destroy();
+      }
+      sockets.clear();
+      httpServer.close(() => resolve());
+    });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates an HTTP server that responds with a 301 redirect to a target URL.
+ * A second server is spun up at the redirect target to detect whether the
+ * redirect was actually followed.
+ */
+async function createRedirectingServer(redirectTarget: string): Promise<TestServer> {
+  const state = { redirectHit: false };
+
+  const targetPort = new URL(redirectTarget).port || '80';
+  const targetServer = http.createServer((_req, res) => {
+    state.redirectHit = true;
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
+    res.end('You should not be here');
+  });
+  const destroyTargetSockets = trackSockets(targetServer);
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) =>
+    targetServer.listen(parseInt(targetPort), '127.0.0.1', resolve),
+  );
+
+  const httpServer = http.createServer((_req, res) => {
+    res.writeHead(301, { Location: redirectTarget });
+    res.end();
+  });
+
+  const destroySockets = trackSockets(httpServer);
+  const port = await getFreePort();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => httpServer.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+
+  return {
+    url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`,
+    get redirectHit() {
+      return state.redirectHit;
+    },
+    close: async () => {
+      await destroySockets();
+      await destroyTargetSockets();
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates a real StreamableHTTP MCP server for baseline connectivity tests.
+ */
+async function createStreamableServer(): Promise<Omit<TestServer, 'redirectHit'>> {
+  const sessions = new Map<string, StreamableHTTPServerTransport>();
+
+  const httpServer = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
+    const sid = req.headers['mcp-session-id'] as string | undefined;
+    let transport = sid ? sessions.get(sid) : undefined;
+
+    if (!transport) {
+      transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID() });
+      const mcp = new McpServer({ name: 'test-ssrf', version: '0.0.1' });
+      await mcp.connect(transport);
+    }
+
+    await transport.handleRequest(req, res);
+
+    if (transport.sessionId && !sessions.has(transport.sessionId)) {
+      sessions.set(transport.sessionId, transport);
+      transport.onclose = () => sessions.delete(transport!.sessionId!);
+    }
+  });
+
+  const destroySockets = trackSockets(httpServer);
+  const port = await getFreePort();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => httpServer.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+
+  return {
+    url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/`,
+    close: async () => {
+      const closing = [...sessions.values()].map((t) => t.close().catch(() => undefined));
+      sessions.clear();
+      await Promise.all(closing);
+      await destroySockets();
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('MCP SSRF protection – redirect blocking', () => {
+  let redirectServer: TestServer;
+  let conn: MCPConnection | null;
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await safeDisconnect(conn);
+    conn = null;
+    if (redirectServer) {
+      await redirectServer.close();
+    }
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('should not follow redirects from streamable-http to a private IP', async () => {
+    const targetPort = await getFreePort();
+    redirectServer = await createRedirectingServer(
+      `http://127.0.0.1:${targetPort}/latest/meta-data/`,
+    );
+
+    conn = new MCPConnection({
+      serverName: 'redirect-test',
+      serverConfig: { type: 'streamable-http', url: redirectServer.url },
+      useSSRFProtection: false,
+    });
+
+    await expect(conn.connect()).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(redirectServer.redirectHit).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should not follow redirects even with SSRF protection off (allowlist scenario)', async () => {
+    const targetPort = await getFreePort();
+    redirectServer = await createRedirectingServer(`http://127.0.0.1:${targetPort}/admin`);
+
+    conn = new MCPConnection({
+      serverName: 'redirect-test-2',
+      serverConfig: { type: 'streamable-http', url: redirectServer.url },
+      useSSRFProtection: false,
+    });
+
+    await expect(conn.connect()).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(redirectServer.redirectHit).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('should connect normally to a non-redirecting streamable-http server', async () => {
+    const realServer = await createStreamableServer();
+    try {
+      conn = new MCPConnection({
+        serverName: 'legit-server',
+        serverConfig: { type: 'streamable-http', url: realServer.url },
+        useSSRFProtection: false,
+      });
+
+      await conn.connect();
+      const tools = await conn.fetchTools();
+      expect(tools).toBeDefined();
+    } finally {
+      await safeDisconnect(conn);
+      conn = null;
+      await realServer.close();
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MCP SSRF protection – WebSocket DNS resolution', () => {
+  let conn: MCPConnection | null;
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await safeDisconnect(conn);
+    conn = null;
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('should block WebSocket to host resolving to private IP when SSRF protection is on', async () => {
+    mockedResolveHostnameSSRF.mockResolvedValueOnce(true);
+
+    conn = new MCPConnection({
+      serverName: 'ws-ssrf-test',
+      serverConfig: { type: 'websocket', url: 'ws://evil.example.com:8080/mcp' },
+      useSSRFProtection: true,
+    });
+
+    await expect(conn.connect()).rejects.toThrow(/SSRF protection/);
+    expect(mockedResolveHostnameSSRF).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining('evil.example.com'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('should block WebSocket to host resolving to private IP even with SSRF protection off', async () => {
+    mockedResolveHostnameSSRF.mockResolvedValueOnce(true);
+
+    conn = new MCPConnection({
+      serverName: 'ws-ssrf-allowlist',
+      serverConfig: { type: 'websocket', url: 'ws://allowlisted.example.com:8080/mcp' },
+      useSSRFProtection: false,
+    });
+
+    await expect(conn.connect()).rejects.toThrow(/SSRF protection/);
+    expect(mockedResolveHostnameSSRF).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining('allowlisted.example.com'),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('should allow WebSocket to host resolving to public IP', async () => {
+    mockedResolveHostnameSSRF.mockResolvedValueOnce(false);
+
+    conn = new MCPConnection({
+      serverName: 'ws-public-test',
+      serverConfig: { type: 'websocket', url: 'ws://public.example.com:8080/mcp' },
+      useSSRFProtection: true,
+    });
+
+    /** Fails on connect (no real server), but the error must not be an SSRF rejection. */
+    await expect(conn.connect()).rejects.not.toThrow(/SSRF protection/);
+  });
+});
--- a/packages/api/src/mcp/connection.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/mcp/connection.ts
@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ export class MCPConnection extends EventEmitter {

      const requestHeaders = getHeaders();
      if (!requestHeaders) {
-        return undiciFetch(input, { ...init, dispatcher });
+        return undiciFetch(input, { ...init, redirect: 'manual', dispatcher });
      }

      let initHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ export class MCPConnection extends EventEmitter {

      return undiciFetch(input, {
        ...init,
+        redirect: 'manual',
        headers: {
          ...initHeaders,
          ...requestHeaders,
@ -425,21 +426,29 @@ export class MCPConnection extends EventEmitter {
            env: { ...getDefaultEnvironment(), ...(options.env ?? {}) },
          });

-        case 'websocket':
+        case 'websocket': {
          if (!isWebSocketOptions(options)) {
            throw new Error('Invalid options for websocket transport.');
          }
          this.url = options.url;
-          if (this.useSSRFProtection) {
-            const wsHostname = new URL(options.url).hostname;
-            const isSSRF = await resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname);
-            if (isSSRF) {
-              throw new Error(
-                `SSRF protection: WebSocket host "${wsHostname}" resolved to a private/reserved IP address`,
-              );
-            }
+          /**
+           * SSRF pre-check: always validate resolved IPs for WebSocket, regardless
+           * of allowlist configuration. Allowlisting a domain grants trust to that
+           * name, not to whatever IP it resolves to at runtime (DNS rebinding).
+           *
+           * Note: WebSocketClientTransport does its own DNS resolution, creating a
+           * small TOCTOU window. This is an SDK limitation — the transport accepts
+           * only a URL with no custom DNS lookup hook.
+           */
+          const wsHostname = new URL(options.url).hostname;
+          const isSSRF = await resolveHostnameSSRF(wsHostname);
+          if (isSSRF) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `SSRF protection: WebSocket host "${wsHostname}" resolved to a private/reserved IP address`,
+            );
          }
          return new WebSocketClientTransport(new URL(options.url));
+        }

        case 'sse': {
          if (!isSSEOptions(options)) {
@ -486,6 +495,7 @@ export class MCPConnection extends EventEmitter {
                );
                return undiciFetch(url, {
                  ...init,
+                  redirect: 'manual',
                  dispatcher: sseAgent,
                  headers: fetchHeaders,
                });