LibreChat/api/server/services/AuthService.spec.js

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🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService (#11782) * 🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService Two independent bugs in `api/server/services/AuthService.js` cause complete authentication failure when using `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true` with Microsoft Entra ID (or Auth0) on `http://localhost` with `NODE_ENV=production`: Bug 1: `secure: isProduction` prevents auth cookies on localhost PR #11518 introduced `shouldUseSecureCookie()` in `socialLogins.js` to handle the case where `NODE_ENV=production` but the server runs on `http://localhost`. However, `AuthService.js` was not updated — it still used `secure: isProduction` in 6 cookie locations across `setAuthTokens()` and `setOpenIDAuthTokens()`. The `token_provider` cookie being dropped is critical: without it, `requireJwtAuth` middleware defaults to the `jwt` strategy instead of `openidJwt`, causing all authenticated requests to return 401. Bug 2: `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` returns `access_token` instead of `id_token` The `openIdJwtStrategy` validates the Bearer token via JWKS. For Entra ID without `OPENID_AUDIENCE`, the `access_token` is a Microsoft Graph API token (opaque or signed for a different audience), which fails JWKS validation. The `id_token` is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's `client_id` as audience — which is what the strategy expects. This is the same root cause as issue #8796 (Auth0 encrypted access tokens). Changes: - Consolidate `shouldUseSecureCookie()` into `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` as a shared, typed utility exported from `@librechat/api`, replacing the duplicate definitions in `AuthService.js` and `socialLogins.js` - Move `isProduction` check inside the function body so it is evaluated at call time rather than module load time - Fix `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` which also used bare `secure: isProduction` for CSRF and session cookies (same localhost bug) - Return `tokenset.id_token || tokenset.access_token` from `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` so JWKS validation works with standard OIDC providers; falls back to `access_token` for backward compatibility - Add 15 tests for `shouldUseSecureCookie()` covering production/dev modes, localhost variants, edge cases, and a documented IPv6 bracket limitation - Add 13 tests for `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` covering token selection, session storage, cookie secure flag delegation, and edge cases Refs: #8796, #11518, #11236, #9931 * chore: Adjust Import Order and Type Definitions in AgentPanel Component - Reordered imports in `AgentPanel.tsx` for better organization and clarity. - Updated type imports to ensure proper usage of `FieldNamesMarkedBoolean` and `TranslationKeys`. - Removed redundant imports to streamline the codebase.
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jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() },
DEFAULT_SESSION_EXPIRY: 900000,
DEFAULT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY: 604800000,
}));
jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
ErrorTypes: {},
SystemRoles: { USER: 'USER', ADMIN: 'ADMIN' },
errorsToString: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({
isEnabled: jest.fn((val) => val === 'true' || val === true),
checkEmailConfig: jest.fn(),
isEmailDomainAllowed: jest.fn(),
math: jest.fn((val, fallback) => (val ? Number(val) : fallback)),
shouldUseSecureCookie: jest.fn(() => false),
🏢 feat: Tenant-Scoped App Config in Auth Login Flows (#12434) * feat: add resolveAppConfigForUser utility for tenant-scoped auth config TypeScript utility in packages/api that wraps getAppConfig in tenantStorage.run() when the user has a tenantId, falling back to baseOnly for new users or non-tenant deployments. Uses DI pattern (getAppConfig passed as parameter) for testability. Auth flows apply role-level overrides only (userId not passed) because user/group principal resolution is deferred to post-auth. * feat: tenant-scoped app config in auth login flows All auth strategies (LDAP, SAML, OpenID, social login) now use a two-phase domain check consistent with requestPasswordReset: 1. Fast-fail with base config (memory-cached, zero DB queries) 2. DB user lookup 3. Tenant-scoped re-check via resolveAppConfigForUser (only when user has a tenantId; otherwise reuse base config) This preserves the original fast-fail protection against globally blocked domains while enabling tenant-specific config overrides. OpenID error ordering preserved: AUTH_FAILED checked before domain re-check so users with wrong providers get the correct error type. registerUser unchanged (baseOnly, no user identity yet). * test: add tenant-scoped config tests for auth strategies Add resolveAppConfig.spec.ts in packages/api with 8 tests: - baseOnly fallback for null/undefined/no-tenant users - tenant-scoped config with role and tenantId - ALS context propagation verified inside getAppConfig callback - undefined role with tenantId edge case Update strategy and AuthService tests to mock resolveAppConfigForUser via @librechat/api. Tests verify two-phase domain check behavior: fast-fail before DB, tenant re-check after. Non-tenant users reuse base config without calling resolveAppConfigForUser. * refactor: skip redundant domain re-check for non-tenant users Guard the second isEmailDomainAllowed call with appConfig !== baseConfig in SAML, OpenID, and social strategies. For non-tenant users the tenant config is the same base config object, so the second check is a no-op. Narrow eslint-disable in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts to the specific require line instead of blanket file-level suppression. * fix: address review findings — consistency, tests, and ordering - Consolidate duplicate require('@librechat/api') in AuthService.js - Add two-phase domain check to LDAP (base fast-fail before findUser), making all strategies consistent with PR description - Add appConfig !== baseConfig guard to requestPasswordReset second domain check, consistent with SAML/OpenID/social strategies - Move SAML provider check before tenant config resolution to avoid unnecessary resolveAppConfigForUser call for wrong-provider users - Add tenant domain rejection tests to SAML, OpenID, and social specs verifying that tenant config restrictions actually block login - Add error propagation tests to resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Remove redundant mockTenantStorage alias in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Narrow eslint-disable to specific require line * test: add tenant domain rejection test for LDAP strategy Covers the appConfig !== baseConfig && !isEmailDomainAllowed path, consistent with SAML, OpenID, and social strategy specs. * refactor: rename resolveAppConfig to app/resolve per AGENTS.md Rename resolveAppConfig.ts → resolve.ts and resolveAppConfig.spec.ts → resolve.spec.ts to align with the project's concise naming convention. * fix: remove fragile reference-equality guard, add logging and docs Remove appConfig !== baseConfig guard from all strategies and requestPasswordReset. The guard relied on implicit cache-backend identity semantics (in-memory Keyv returns same object reference) that would silently break with Redis or cloned configs. The second isEmailDomainAllowed call is a cheap synchronous check — always running it is clearer and eliminates the coupling. Add audit logging to requestPasswordReset domain blocks (base and tenant), consistent with all auth strategies. Extract duplicated error construction into makeDomainDeniedError(). Wrap resolveAppConfigForUser in requestPasswordReset with try/catch to prevent DB errors from leaking to the client via the controller's generic catch handler. Document the dual tenantId propagation (ALS for DB isolation, explicit param for cache key) in resolveAppConfigForUser JSDoc. Add comment documenting the LDAP error-type ordering change (cross-provider users from blocked domains now get 'domain not allowed' instead of AUTH_FAILED). Assert resolveAppConfigForUser is not called on LDAP provider mismatch path. * fix: return generic response for tenant domain block in password reset Tenant-scoped domain rejection in requestPasswordReset now returns the same generic "If an account with that email exists..." response instead of an Error. This prevents user-enumeration: an attacker cannot distinguish between "email not found" and "tenant blocks this domain" by comparing HTTP responses. The base-config fast-fail (pre-user-lookup) still returns an Error since it fires before any user existence is revealed. * docs: document phase 1 vs phase 2 domain check behavior in JSDoc Phase 1 (base config, pre-findUser) intentionally returns Error/400 to reveal globally blocked domains without confirming user existence. Phase 2 (tenant config, post-findUser) returns generic 200 to prevent user-enumeration. This distinction is now explicit in the JSDoc.
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resolveAppConfigForUser: jest.fn(async (_getAppConfig, _user) => ({})),
🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService (#11782) * 🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService Two independent bugs in `api/server/services/AuthService.js` cause complete authentication failure when using `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true` with Microsoft Entra ID (or Auth0) on `http://localhost` with `NODE_ENV=production`: Bug 1: `secure: isProduction` prevents auth cookies on localhost PR #11518 introduced `shouldUseSecureCookie()` in `socialLogins.js` to handle the case where `NODE_ENV=production` but the server runs on `http://localhost`. However, `AuthService.js` was not updated — it still used `secure: isProduction` in 6 cookie locations across `setAuthTokens()` and `setOpenIDAuthTokens()`. The `token_provider` cookie being dropped is critical: without it, `requireJwtAuth` middleware defaults to the `jwt` strategy instead of `openidJwt`, causing all authenticated requests to return 401. Bug 2: `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` returns `access_token` instead of `id_token` The `openIdJwtStrategy` validates the Bearer token via JWKS. For Entra ID without `OPENID_AUDIENCE`, the `access_token` is a Microsoft Graph API token (opaque or signed for a different audience), which fails JWKS validation. The `id_token` is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's `client_id` as audience — which is what the strategy expects. This is the same root cause as issue #8796 (Auth0 encrypted access tokens). Changes: - Consolidate `shouldUseSecureCookie()` into `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` as a shared, typed utility exported from `@librechat/api`, replacing the duplicate definitions in `AuthService.js` and `socialLogins.js` - Move `isProduction` check inside the function body so it is evaluated at call time rather than module load time - Fix `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` which also used bare `secure: isProduction` for CSRF and session cookies (same localhost bug) - Return `tokenset.id_token || tokenset.access_token` from `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` so JWKS validation works with standard OIDC providers; falls back to `access_token` for backward compatibility - Add 15 tests for `shouldUseSecureCookie()` covering production/dev modes, localhost variants, edge cases, and a documented IPv6 bracket limitation - Add 13 tests for `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` covering token selection, session storage, cookie secure flag delegation, and edge cases Refs: #8796, #11518, #11236, #9931 * chore: Adjust Import Order and Type Definitions in AgentPanel Component - Reordered imports in `AgentPanel.tsx` for better organization and clarity. - Updated type imports to ensure proper usage of `FieldNamesMarkedBoolean` and `TranslationKeys`. - Removed redundant imports to streamline the codebase.
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}));
jest.mock('~/models', () => ({
findUser: jest.fn(),
findToken: jest.fn(),
createUser: jest.fn(),
updateUser: jest.fn(),
countUsers: jest.fn(),
getUserById: jest.fn(),
findSession: jest.fn(),
createToken: jest.fn(),
deleteTokens: jest.fn(),
deleteSession: jest.fn(),
createSession: jest.fn(),
generateToken: jest.fn(),
deleteUserById: jest.fn(),
generateRefreshToken: jest.fn(),
}));
jest.mock('~/strategies/validators', () => ({ registerSchema: { parse: jest.fn() } }));
jest.mock('~/server/services/Config', () => ({ getAppConfig: jest.fn() }));
jest.mock('~/server/utils', () => ({ sendEmail: jest.fn() }));
🏢 feat: Tenant-Scoped App Config in Auth Login Flows (#12434) * feat: add resolveAppConfigForUser utility for tenant-scoped auth config TypeScript utility in packages/api that wraps getAppConfig in tenantStorage.run() when the user has a tenantId, falling back to baseOnly for new users or non-tenant deployments. Uses DI pattern (getAppConfig passed as parameter) for testability. Auth flows apply role-level overrides only (userId not passed) because user/group principal resolution is deferred to post-auth. * feat: tenant-scoped app config in auth login flows All auth strategies (LDAP, SAML, OpenID, social login) now use a two-phase domain check consistent with requestPasswordReset: 1. Fast-fail with base config (memory-cached, zero DB queries) 2. DB user lookup 3. Tenant-scoped re-check via resolveAppConfigForUser (only when user has a tenantId; otherwise reuse base config) This preserves the original fast-fail protection against globally blocked domains while enabling tenant-specific config overrides. OpenID error ordering preserved: AUTH_FAILED checked before domain re-check so users with wrong providers get the correct error type. registerUser unchanged (baseOnly, no user identity yet). * test: add tenant-scoped config tests for auth strategies Add resolveAppConfig.spec.ts in packages/api with 8 tests: - baseOnly fallback for null/undefined/no-tenant users - tenant-scoped config with role and tenantId - ALS context propagation verified inside getAppConfig callback - undefined role with tenantId edge case Update strategy and AuthService tests to mock resolveAppConfigForUser via @librechat/api. Tests verify two-phase domain check behavior: fast-fail before DB, tenant re-check after. Non-tenant users reuse base config without calling resolveAppConfigForUser. * refactor: skip redundant domain re-check for non-tenant users Guard the second isEmailDomainAllowed call with appConfig !== baseConfig in SAML, OpenID, and social strategies. For non-tenant users the tenant config is the same base config object, so the second check is a no-op. Narrow eslint-disable in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts to the specific require line instead of blanket file-level suppression. * fix: address review findings — consistency, tests, and ordering - Consolidate duplicate require('@librechat/api') in AuthService.js - Add two-phase domain check to LDAP (base fast-fail before findUser), making all strategies consistent with PR description - Add appConfig !== baseConfig guard to requestPasswordReset second domain check, consistent with SAML/OpenID/social strategies - Move SAML provider check before tenant config resolution to avoid unnecessary resolveAppConfigForUser call for wrong-provider users - Add tenant domain rejection tests to SAML, OpenID, and social specs verifying that tenant config restrictions actually block login - Add error propagation tests to resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Remove redundant mockTenantStorage alias in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Narrow eslint-disable to specific require line * test: add tenant domain rejection test for LDAP strategy Covers the appConfig !== baseConfig && !isEmailDomainAllowed path, consistent with SAML, OpenID, and social strategy specs. * refactor: rename resolveAppConfig to app/resolve per AGENTS.md Rename resolveAppConfig.ts → resolve.ts and resolveAppConfig.spec.ts → resolve.spec.ts to align with the project's concise naming convention. * fix: remove fragile reference-equality guard, add logging and docs Remove appConfig !== baseConfig guard from all strategies and requestPasswordReset. The guard relied on implicit cache-backend identity semantics (in-memory Keyv returns same object reference) that would silently break with Redis or cloned configs. The second isEmailDomainAllowed call is a cheap synchronous check — always running it is clearer and eliminates the coupling. Add audit logging to requestPasswordReset domain blocks (base and tenant), consistent with all auth strategies. Extract duplicated error construction into makeDomainDeniedError(). Wrap resolveAppConfigForUser in requestPasswordReset with try/catch to prevent DB errors from leaking to the client via the controller's generic catch handler. Document the dual tenantId propagation (ALS for DB isolation, explicit param for cache key) in resolveAppConfigForUser JSDoc. Add comment documenting the LDAP error-type ordering change (cross-provider users from blocked domains now get 'domain not allowed' instead of AUTH_FAILED). Assert resolveAppConfigForUser is not called on LDAP provider mismatch path. * fix: return generic response for tenant domain block in password reset Tenant-scoped domain rejection in requestPasswordReset now returns the same generic "If an account with that email exists..." response instead of an Error. This prevents user-enumeration: an attacker cannot distinguish between "email not found" and "tenant blocks this domain" by comparing HTTP responses. The base-config fast-fail (pre-user-lookup) still returns an Error since it fires before any user existence is revealed. * docs: document phase 1 vs phase 2 domain check behavior in JSDoc Phase 1 (base config, pre-findUser) intentionally returns Error/400 to reveal globally blocked domains without confirming user existence. Phase 2 (tenant config, post-findUser) returns generic 200 to prevent user-enumeration. This distinction is now explicit in the JSDoc.
2026-03-27 16:08:43 -04:00
const {
shouldUseSecureCookie,
isEmailDomainAllowed,
resolveAppConfigForUser,
} = require('@librechat/api');
const { findUser } = require('~/models');
const { getAppConfig } = require('~/server/services/Config');
const { setOpenIDAuthTokens, requestPasswordReset } = require('./AuthService');
🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService (#11782) * 🔒 fix: Secure Cookie Localhost Bypass and OpenID Token Selection in AuthService Two independent bugs in `api/server/services/AuthService.js` cause complete authentication failure when using `OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS=true` with Microsoft Entra ID (or Auth0) on `http://localhost` with `NODE_ENV=production`: Bug 1: `secure: isProduction` prevents auth cookies on localhost PR #11518 introduced `shouldUseSecureCookie()` in `socialLogins.js` to handle the case where `NODE_ENV=production` but the server runs on `http://localhost`. However, `AuthService.js` was not updated — it still used `secure: isProduction` in 6 cookie locations across `setAuthTokens()` and `setOpenIDAuthTokens()`. The `token_provider` cookie being dropped is critical: without it, `requireJwtAuth` middleware defaults to the `jwt` strategy instead of `openidJwt`, causing all authenticated requests to return 401. Bug 2: `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` returns `access_token` instead of `id_token` The `openIdJwtStrategy` validates the Bearer token via JWKS. For Entra ID without `OPENID_AUDIENCE`, the `access_token` is a Microsoft Graph API token (opaque or signed for a different audience), which fails JWKS validation. The `id_token` is always a standard JWT signed by the IdP's JWKS keys with the app's `client_id` as audience — which is what the strategy expects. This is the same root cause as issue #8796 (Auth0 encrypted access tokens). Changes: - Consolidate `shouldUseSecureCookie()` into `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` as a shared, typed utility exported from `@librechat/api`, replacing the duplicate definitions in `AuthService.js` and `socialLogins.js` - Move `isProduction` check inside the function body so it is evaluated at call time rather than module load time - Fix `packages/api/src/oauth/csrf.ts` which also used bare `secure: isProduction` for CSRF and session cookies (same localhost bug) - Return `tokenset.id_token || tokenset.access_token` from `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` so JWKS validation works with standard OIDC providers; falls back to `access_token` for backward compatibility - Add 15 tests for `shouldUseSecureCookie()` covering production/dev modes, localhost variants, edge cases, and a documented IPv6 bracket limitation - Add 13 tests for `setOpenIDAuthTokens()` covering token selection, session storage, cookie secure flag delegation, and edge cases Refs: #8796, #11518, #11236, #9931 * chore: Adjust Import Order and Type Definitions in AgentPanel Component - Reordered imports in `AgentPanel.tsx` for better organization and clarity. - Updated type imports to ensure proper usage of `FieldNamesMarkedBoolean` and `TranslationKeys`. - Removed redundant imports to streamline the codebase.
2026-02-13 10:35:51 -05:00
/** Helper to build a mock Express response */
function mockResponse() {
const cookies = {};
const res = {
cookie: jest.fn((name, value, options) => {
cookies[name] = { value, options };
}),
_cookies: cookies,
};
return res;
}
/** Helper to build a mock Express request with session */
function mockRequest(sessionData = {}) {
return {
session: { openidTokens: null, ...sessionData },
};
}
describe('setOpenIDAuthTokens', () => {
const env = process.env;
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
process.env = {
...env,
JWT_REFRESH_SECRET: 'test-refresh-secret',
OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS: 'true',
};
});
afterAll(() => {
process.env = env;
});
describe('token selection (id_token vs access_token)', () => {
it('should return id_token when both id_token and access_token are present', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBe('the-id-token');
});
it('should return access_token when id_token is not available', () => {
const tokenset = {
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBe('the-access-token');
});
it('should return access_token when id_token is undefined', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: undefined,
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBe('the-access-token');
});
it('should return access_token when id_token is null', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: null,
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBe('the-access-token');
});
it('should return id_token even when id_token and access_token differ', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'id-token-jwt-signed-by-idp',
access_token: 'opaque-graph-api-token',
refresh_token: 'refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBe('id-token-jwt-signed-by-idp');
expect(result).not.toBe('opaque-graph-api-token');
});
});
describe('session token storage', () => {
it('should store the original access_token in session (not id_token)', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(req.session.openidTokens.accessToken).toBe('the-access-token');
expect(req.session.openidTokens.refreshToken).toBe('the-refresh-token');
});
});
describe('cookie secure flag', () => {
it('should call shouldUseSecureCookie for every cookie set', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
// token_provider + openid_user_id (session path, so no refreshToken/openid_access_token cookies)
const secureCalls = shouldUseSecureCookie.mock.calls.length;
expect(secureCalls).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
// Verify all cookies use the result of shouldUseSecureCookie
for (const [, cookie] of Object.entries(res._cookies)) {
expect(cookie.options.secure).toBe(false);
}
});
it('should set secure: true when shouldUseSecureCookie returns true', () => {
shouldUseSecureCookie.mockReturnValue(true);
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
for (const [, cookie] of Object.entries(res._cookies)) {
expect(cookie.options.secure).toBe(true);
}
});
it('should use shouldUseSecureCookie for cookie fallback path (no session)', () => {
shouldUseSecureCookie.mockReturnValue(false);
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
refresh_token: 'the-refresh-token',
};
const req = { session: null };
const res = mockResponse();
setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
// In the cookie fallback path, we get: refreshToken, openid_access_token, token_provider, openid_user_id
expect(res.cookie).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'refreshToken',
expect.any(String),
expect.objectContaining({ secure: false }),
);
expect(res.cookie).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'openid_access_token',
expect.any(String),
expect.objectContaining({ secure: false }),
);
expect(res.cookie).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'token_provider',
'openid',
expect.objectContaining({ secure: false }),
);
});
});
describe('edge cases', () => {
it('should return undefined when tokenset is null', () => {
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(null, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should return undefined when access_token is missing', () => {
const tokenset = { refresh_token: 'refresh' };
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should return undefined when no refresh token is available', () => {
const tokenset = { access_token: 'access', id_token: 'id' };
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123');
expect(result).toBeUndefined();
});
it('should use existingRefreshToken when tokenset has no refresh_token', () => {
const tokenset = {
id_token: 'the-id-token',
access_token: 'the-access-token',
};
const req = mockRequest();
const res = mockResponse();
const result = setOpenIDAuthTokens(tokenset, req, res, 'user-123', 'existing-refresh');
expect(result).toBe('the-id-token');
expect(req.session.openidTokens.refreshToken).toBe('existing-refresh');
});
});
});
🏢 feat: Tenant-Scoped App Config in Auth Login Flows (#12434) * feat: add resolveAppConfigForUser utility for tenant-scoped auth config TypeScript utility in packages/api that wraps getAppConfig in tenantStorage.run() when the user has a tenantId, falling back to baseOnly for new users or non-tenant deployments. Uses DI pattern (getAppConfig passed as parameter) for testability. Auth flows apply role-level overrides only (userId not passed) because user/group principal resolution is deferred to post-auth. * feat: tenant-scoped app config in auth login flows All auth strategies (LDAP, SAML, OpenID, social login) now use a two-phase domain check consistent with requestPasswordReset: 1. Fast-fail with base config (memory-cached, zero DB queries) 2. DB user lookup 3. Tenant-scoped re-check via resolveAppConfigForUser (only when user has a tenantId; otherwise reuse base config) This preserves the original fast-fail protection against globally blocked domains while enabling tenant-specific config overrides. OpenID error ordering preserved: AUTH_FAILED checked before domain re-check so users with wrong providers get the correct error type. registerUser unchanged (baseOnly, no user identity yet). * test: add tenant-scoped config tests for auth strategies Add resolveAppConfig.spec.ts in packages/api with 8 tests: - baseOnly fallback for null/undefined/no-tenant users - tenant-scoped config with role and tenantId - ALS context propagation verified inside getAppConfig callback - undefined role with tenantId edge case Update strategy and AuthService tests to mock resolveAppConfigForUser via @librechat/api. Tests verify two-phase domain check behavior: fast-fail before DB, tenant re-check after. Non-tenant users reuse base config without calling resolveAppConfigForUser. * refactor: skip redundant domain re-check for non-tenant users Guard the second isEmailDomainAllowed call with appConfig !== baseConfig in SAML, OpenID, and social strategies. For non-tenant users the tenant config is the same base config object, so the second check is a no-op. Narrow eslint-disable in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts to the specific require line instead of blanket file-level suppression. * fix: address review findings — consistency, tests, and ordering - Consolidate duplicate require('@librechat/api') in AuthService.js - Add two-phase domain check to LDAP (base fast-fail before findUser), making all strategies consistent with PR description - Add appConfig !== baseConfig guard to requestPasswordReset second domain check, consistent with SAML/OpenID/social strategies - Move SAML provider check before tenant config resolution to avoid unnecessary resolveAppConfigForUser call for wrong-provider users - Add tenant domain rejection tests to SAML, OpenID, and social specs verifying that tenant config restrictions actually block login - Add error propagation tests to resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Remove redundant mockTenantStorage alias in resolveAppConfig.spec.ts - Narrow eslint-disable to specific require line * test: add tenant domain rejection test for LDAP strategy Covers the appConfig !== baseConfig && !isEmailDomainAllowed path, consistent with SAML, OpenID, and social strategy specs. * refactor: rename resolveAppConfig to app/resolve per AGENTS.md Rename resolveAppConfig.ts → resolve.ts and resolveAppConfig.spec.ts → resolve.spec.ts to align with the project's concise naming convention. * fix: remove fragile reference-equality guard, add logging and docs Remove appConfig !== baseConfig guard from all strategies and requestPasswordReset. The guard relied on implicit cache-backend identity semantics (in-memory Keyv returns same object reference) that would silently break with Redis or cloned configs. The second isEmailDomainAllowed call is a cheap synchronous check — always running it is clearer and eliminates the coupling. Add audit logging to requestPasswordReset domain blocks (base and tenant), consistent with all auth strategies. Extract duplicated error construction into makeDomainDeniedError(). Wrap resolveAppConfigForUser in requestPasswordReset with try/catch to prevent DB errors from leaking to the client via the controller's generic catch handler. Document the dual tenantId propagation (ALS for DB isolation, explicit param for cache key) in resolveAppConfigForUser JSDoc. Add comment documenting the LDAP error-type ordering change (cross-provider users from blocked domains now get 'domain not allowed' instead of AUTH_FAILED). Assert resolveAppConfigForUser is not called on LDAP provider mismatch path. * fix: return generic response for tenant domain block in password reset Tenant-scoped domain rejection in requestPasswordReset now returns the same generic "If an account with that email exists..." response instead of an Error. This prevents user-enumeration: an attacker cannot distinguish between "email not found" and "tenant blocks this domain" by comparing HTTP responses. The base-config fast-fail (pre-user-lookup) still returns an Error since it fires before any user existence is revealed. * docs: document phase 1 vs phase 2 domain check behavior in JSDoc Phase 1 (base config, pre-findUser) intentionally returns Error/400 to reveal globally blocked domains without confirming user existence. Phase 2 (tenant config, post-findUser) returns generic 200 to prevent user-enumeration. This distinction is now explicit in the JSDoc.
2026-03-27 16:08:43 -04:00
describe('requestPasswordReset', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
jest.clearAllMocks();
isEmailDomainAllowed.mockReturnValue(true);
getAppConfig.mockResolvedValue({
registration: { allowedDomains: ['example.com'] },
});
resolveAppConfigForUser.mockResolvedValue({
registration: { allowedDomains: ['example.com'] },
});
});
it('should fast-fail with base config before DB lookup for blocked domains', async () => {
isEmailDomainAllowed.mockReturnValue(false);
const req = { body: { email: 'blocked@evil.com' }, ip: '127.0.0.1' };
const result = await requestPasswordReset(req);
expect(getAppConfig).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ baseOnly: true });
expect(findUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(result).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
});
it('should call resolveAppConfigForUser for tenant user', async () => {
const user = {
_id: 'user-tenant',
email: 'user@example.com',
tenantId: 'tenant-x',
role: 'USER',
};
findUser.mockResolvedValue(user);
const req = { body: { email: 'user@example.com' }, ip: '127.0.0.1' };
await requestPasswordReset(req);
expect(resolveAppConfigForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(getAppConfig, user);
});
it('should reuse baseConfig for non-tenant user without calling resolveAppConfigForUser', async () => {
findUser.mockResolvedValue({ _id: 'user-no-tenant', email: 'user@example.com' });
const req = { body: { email: 'user@example.com' }, ip: '127.0.0.1' };
await requestPasswordReset(req);
expect(resolveAppConfigForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should return generic response when tenant config blocks the domain (non-enumerable)', async () => {
const user = {
_id: 'user-tenant',
email: 'user@example.com',
tenantId: 'tenant-x',
role: 'USER',
};
findUser.mockResolvedValue(user);
isEmailDomainAllowed.mockReturnValueOnce(true).mockReturnValueOnce(false);
const req = { body: { email: 'user@example.com' }, ip: '127.0.0.1' };
const result = await requestPasswordReset(req);
expect(result).not.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(result.message).toContain('If an account with that email exists');
});
});